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INTRODUCTION
In 1980, the Hague Conference on Private International Law' cre-
ated the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International
Child Abduction2 (Convention) as an attempt to supply parents with a
legal tool to assist them in achieving the return of children removed
across international boundaries without consent of the left-behind
parents. " The Convention has been in force in the United States for
t A.B. 1997, Brown University;J.D. Candidate 2003, University of Pennsylvania. I
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Professor Harry Reicher for his helpful feedback. Special thanks to Matthew Di Gugli-
elmo; Henry and Terri Walters; Stephanie Walters; and Jim and Francesca Di
Guglielmo for their love and encouragement. Finally, I thank the editors of Volume
151 of the University of Pennsylvania Law Review for their dedication and diligence.
'The 1980 Hague Conference consisted of twenty-seven member states,
three participating states, three international governmental organizations, and three
nongovernmental organizations. See Procks-verbaux et Documents de travail de la Premi're
commission, in 3 HAGUE CONFERENCE ON PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW, ACRES ET
DOCUMENTS DE LA QUATORZItME SESSION, ENLEVEMENT D'ENFANTS [ACTs AND
DOCUMENTS OF THE FOURTEENTH SESSION, CHILD ABDUCTION] 253, 253-55 (1982)
(listing the members of the First Commission of the Hague Conference on Private In-
ternational Law).
2 Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction, Oct. 25, 1980,
T.I.A.S. No. 11,670, at 1, 22,514 U.N.T.S. 97, 98 [hereinafter Convention], reprinted in
51 Fed. Reg. 10,493 (Mar. 26, 1986).
See Hague International Child Abduction Convention; Text and Legal Analysis,
Letter of Transmittal, 51 Fed. Reg. 10,494, 10,495 (Mar. 26, 1986) [hereinafter Presi-
dent's Letter] (providing President Reagan's summary of the Convention to the
United States Senate: "[It] is designed to secure the prompt return of children who
have been abducted from their country of habitual residence or wrongfully retained
outside that country. It also seeks to facilitate the exercise of visitation rights across
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more than thirteen years,' and a significant body of foreign and do-
mestic case law interpreting its provisions has developed. While
courts have begun working toward consistent interpretations of the
fundamental provisions of the Convention, ' and have worked dili-
gently to apply these interpretations to the complex factual, legal, and
emotional situations that arise in the context of the removal of a child
across international boundaries, areas for improvement remain.
When custody proceedings are started, but not completed, prior
to the international abduction of a child, the custody issues become
particularly complex. One issue is how an interim decision issued by a
foreign tribunal prior to the child's removal should affect a court's
decision on a petition for return under the Convention.' In this
Comment, I argue that U.S. courts should adopt an approach that re-
spects the temporary character of an interim order rather than auto-
matically recognizing the terms of the order at face value. Courts
should rarely interpret interim custody orders as altering the parties'
custody rights under the Convention. Rather than accept interim de-
international borders."). International child abduction presents a particularly com-
plex problem because often both the person who removes the child and the person
left-behind have some basis for claiming custody-often each is a parent of the ab-
ducted child. See Elisa Prez-Vera, Explanatory Report, in 3 HAGUE CONFERENCE ON
PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 1, at 426, 1 11, at 429 [hereinafter Perez-
Vera, Report] ("The problem ... concerns [an abductor] who.., belongs to the family
circle of the child; indeed, in the majority of cases, the person concerned is the father
or mother."). For purposes of this Comment, I shall use the words "abduction" and
"removal" interchangeably. Though the title of the Convention refers to "interna-
tional child abduction," the drafters chose not to use "abduction" or "kidnapping" in
the body of the treaty to avoid the criminal connotations that accompany those terms.
See id. 53, at 441 (differentiating the connotations of the words "abduction" and "re-
moval" based on "the relationship which normally exists between 'abductor' and
'child' and ... the intentions of the former").
4 See H.R. REP. NO. 100-525, at I (reporting the implementation of the Conven-
tion in the United States), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 386, 386.
5 But see Marilyn Freeman, Rights of Custody and Access Under the Hague Child Abduc-
tion Convention-A "Questionable Result?,"31 CAL. W. INT'L L.J. 39, 39 (2000)
("[C]orrectness of approach has, at times, been sacrificed to the flexibility required to
ensure the abducted child's return. The outcome has been a haze of inconsistent ju-
dicial results.").
6 For purposes of this Comment, I shall use "interim custody order" to mean an
order, issued by a court with jurisdiction over custody proceedings, that establishes
temporary care and custody arrangements until the-court is equipped to issue a final
custody decision. See generally LINDA D. ELROD, CHILD CUSTODY PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE § 8:02 (1997) ("A temporary [custody] order gives the parents and the
child some definite arrangements during the time before the [final decision] and en-
sures that at least one parent has full legal authority for schooling, medical care and
the like.").
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cisions at face value, courts should consider the legal and factual reali-
ties of the family members prior to entry of the interim order. This
approach is consistent with the broad purpose and scope of the Con-
vention as well as its goal of ensuring that an abducted child is
promptly returned to the country best situated to decide the child's
future-the country where he or she lived prior to the abduction.
U.S. courts have been entrusted by Congress to decide petitions
brought pursuant to the Convention fairly, expeditiously, and in keep-
ing with the Convention's broad design, despite the challenges the
cases present. Understanding the broad scope of the custody rights
protected by the Convention is often the first challenge facing a court
asked to decide a Convention petition. I suggest that the scope of the
Convention extends, under most circumstances, to protect those
rights held by a left-behind parent prior to international removal of
his or her child and not yet terminated by a final decision of a court
with jurisdiction over that parent's custody rights.
Part I of this Comment provides an overview of the Convention's
purposes, provisions, and scope. In Part II, I introduce a recent Colo-
rado case in which the parties disputed the effect of a German court's
interim order on their custody rights with respect to their daughter.
In Part III, I argue that interim custody decisions should not alter par-
ties' custody rights for purposes of a subsequent petition for return
under the Convention. In Part IV, I apply that analysis to the provi-
sions of the interim order at issue in the Colorado case and conclude
that the specific provisions of that order should not have altered the
approach taken in that case fiom the approach proposed in Part III.
I. THE HAGUE CONVENTION ON INTERNATIONAL CHILD ABDUCTION:
BACKGROUND, PURPOSES, AND SCOPE
The Fourteenth Session of the Hague Conference on Private In-
ternational Law adopted the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects
of International Child Abduction on October 24, 1980, and opened
the Convention for signature on October 25, 1980.' The United
States signed the Convention on December 23, 1981.8 Congressional
7 President's Letter, supra note 3, at 10,495.
8 H.R. REP. No. 100-525, at 5. The United States Senate ratified the Convention
by a vote of ninety-eight to zero on October 9, 1986. Patricia M. Hoff, Legislative History
of the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction, in
INTERNATIONAL CHILD ABDUCTIONS: A GUIDE TO APPLYING T1IE 1988 HAGUE
CONVENTION 16, 16 (Gloria F. DeHart ed., 1989).
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adoption of the International Child Abduction Remedies Act
(ICARA)9 in 1988 implemented the Convention in the United States.
The Convention requires prompt return of any child under the
age of sixteen who has been wrongfully removed from his or her
country of habitual residence.' ° If a petitioner successfully proves that
the child was wrongfully removed from his or her place of habitual
residence, a respondent may prevent the return only by proving one
of the exceptions set forth in the Convention." This Part will first
provide an overview of the purposes of the Convention and then will
outline the scope of the remedies and exceptions established therein.
42 U.S.C. §§ 11,601-11,610 (2000).
I0 Convention, supra note 2, at arts. 3-4, 12. The Convention also requires the
remedy of return in the case of a child who has been wrongfully retained in a country
other than his or her habitual residence. Id. at arts. 3-4, 12. For purposes of this
Comment, "remove" or "removal" will mean "remove or retain" or "removal or reten-
tion."
II See id. at art. 13 (providing exceptions to the remedy of return if the respondent
can prove that the petitioner was not "actually exercising" his or her custody rights at
the time of removal or had acquiesced in the removal, if return would create "grave
risk" to the child, or upon a mature child's objection); id. at art. 20 (providing the
"human rights" exception). In addition to the exceptions in Articles 13 and 20, Article
12 allows a court to refuse return if the removal occurred more than one year ago and
"it is demonstrated that the child is now settled in [his or her] new environment." Id.
at art. 12. Some authorities refer to this provision as an exception. See ICARA §
11,603(e) (2) (B) (implying that Article 12 contains one or more exceptions); Lops v.
Lops, 140 F.3d 927, 945 (11th Cir. 1998) ("Respondents had not established an af-
firmative defense under the 'well-settled' exception."). Others do not include it
among the exceptions provided for by the Convention. See PNrez-Vera, Report, supra
note 3, 1 106-18, at 459-62 (stating that the exceptions to return are to be found in
Articles 13 and 20 and discussing the Article 12 provision in terms of reducing the obli-
gation of a court to return a child and "preserving the contingent discretionary powers
of internal authorities in this regard"); Richard J. Podell, The Hague Convention on the
Civil Aspects of International Child Abductions, in 101+ PRACTICAL SOLUTIONS FOR THE
FAMILY LAWYER 127, 129 (Gregg Herman ed., 1996) (listing only Articles 13 and 20 as
providing exceptions). Elisa PNrez-Vera was the official reporter of the Convention;
her Explanatory Report is recognized as the "'official history and commentary on the
Convention and is a source of background on the meaning of the provisions of the
Convention."' Blondin v. Dubois, 189 F.3d 240, 246 n.5 (2d Cir. 1999) (quoting
Hague International Child Abduction Convention; Text and Legal Analysis, Legal
Analysis of the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduc-
tion, 51 Fed. Reg. 10,503, 10,503 (Mar. 26, 1986) [hereinafter Legal Analysis]).
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A. Objectives
The Convention includes two explicit objectives: "to secure the
prompt return of children wrongfully removed to or retained in any
Contracting State" and "to ensure that rights of custody and of access
under the law of one Contracting State are effectively respected in the
other Contracting States.' 2 Several purposes motivated both the crea-
tion of the Convention and its implementation in the United States.
It was intended primarily to protect children from the harmful effects
of international child abduction. 13 Scholars and legislators saw inter-
national cooperation as the most effective method of combating the
increasing number of international abductions. 4 The Convention was
also intended to serve as a deterrent to international child abduc-
tions, 15 to prevent alterations to custodial rights as the result of
12 Convention, supra note 2, at art. 1.
13 See Legal Analysis, supra note 11, at 10,504 ("A fundamental purpose of the
Hague Convention is to protect children .... Children who are wrongfully moved
from country to country are deprived of the stable relationships which the Convention
is designed promptly to restore."); see also ICARA § 11,601 (a) (2) ("The international
abduction of children ... is harmful to their well-being."). The official report inti-
mates that the "best interests of the child" are served by the twin aims of the Conven-
tion, "the one preventive, the other designed to secure the immediate reintegration of
the child into [his or her] habitual environment." PNrez-Vera, Report, supra note 3, 1
25, at 432.
14 See ICARA § 11,601 (a) (3) ("International abductions and retentions of children
are increasing, and only concerted cooperation pursuant to an international agree-
ment can effectively combat this problem."); see also GERALDINE VAN BUEREN, THE
BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD-INTERNATIONAL CO-OPERATION ON CHILD ABDUCTION
5 (1993) ("Although parental child abduction has been an offence in the United
Kingdom since ... 1984, the reality is that there is a high probability of success where
children are taken to certain non-treaty states. This means that an essential element of
the treaty system, the deterrent factor, is absent." (footnote omittec)); J.M. Eekelaar,
The International Abduction of Children by a Parent or Guardian, in COMMONWEALTH
SECRETARIAT, MEETING OF COMMONWEALTH LAW MINISTERS, BARBADOS, 28 APRIL-2
MAY, 1980, at 199, 210 (1980) ("[D]iscouragement of [international child abduction]
requires arrangements to be internationally agreed for the return of children .....
15 See ICARA § 11,601 (a) (4) ("The Convention provides a sound treaty framework
to help resolve the problem of international abduction ... of children and will deter
such wrongful removals ...."); Eekelaar, supra note 14, at 210 (explaining that deter-
rence is "an essential element" of the treaty system); see also Prez-Vera, Report, supra
note 3, 1 16, at 429 (summarizing one of the Convention's methods: "since one ...
characteristic ... [is] that the abductor claims that his action has been rendered lawful
by the competent authorities of the State of refuge, one effective way of deterring him
would be to deprive his actions of any practical or juridical consequences"). Deter-
rence of abduction has been seen as a primary reason for returning children to the
country from which they were abducted since well before the drafting of the Conven-
tion. See Eekelaar, supra note 14, at 208 (noting that deterrence "is a very obvious rea-
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unilateral action by individuals," and to prevent "forum-shopping"" in
custody disputes. It does not serve to create or enforce a custody deci-
sion; in fact, authorities in the country to which the child has
been removed are expressly prohibited from deciding the merits of a
custody dispute unless they first determine that the child is not re-
quired to be returned under the Convention.'
son for making 'peremptory' orders for the return of children," as articulated by sev-
eral English judges in the 1950s and 1960s). Some scholars believe that the Conven-
tion has been effective in deterring abduction. See VAN BUEREN, supra note 14, at 22
(stating that "'there is reason to believe that the Child Abduction Convention is dis-
couraging parental [kidnapping]"' (quoting Caroline La Gette, Note, International
Child Abduction and the Hague Convention: Emerging Practice and Interpretation of the Discre-
tionary Exception, 25 TEX. INT'L L.J. 287, 288 (1990))). For a discussion of why treaties
are necessary to combat international abduction and the advantages of multilateral
treaties in addressing the problem, see generally id. at 5-6, 39.
16 See Croll v. Croll, 229 F.3d 133, 142 (2d Cir. 2000) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting)
(identifying "the Convention's goal of preventing parents from unilaterally circum-
venting the home country's custody law"); see also [CARA § 11,601(a) (2) ("Persons
should not be permitted to obtain custody of children by virtue of their wrongful re-
moval or retention."); P6rez-Vera, Report, supra note 3, 1 11, at 428 ("[T]he situations
envisaged are those which derive from the use of force to establish artificial jurisdic-
tional links on an international level, with a view to obtaining custody of a child.").
17 Prevention of international forum-shopping has been described as "a para-
mount purpose of the Hague Convention." Turner v. Frowein, 752 A.2d 955, 972
(Conn. 2000); see also Friedrich v. Friedrich, 983 F.2d 1396, 1400 (6th Cir. 1993) (de-
scribing a "primary purpose" of the Convention "to preserve the status quo and to de-
ter parents from crossing international boundaries in search of a more sympathetic
court"). Prevention of forum-shopping is one of the methods by which the Conven-
tion deters international child abduction. By denying the legal advantage an abductor
seeks to obtain in a custody dispute by choosing "the forum in which the case is to be
decided, a forum which, in principle, he regards as more favourable to his own
claims," the Convention reduces the incentive to abduct the child across international
boundaries. P6rez-Vera, Report, supra note 3, 1 14, at 429; see also President's Letter,
supra note 3, at 10,495 (explaining that the Convention works to deny "[t]he interna-
tional abductor.., legal advantage from the abduction").
18 See ANNE-MARIE HUTCHINSON ET AL., INTERNAT~IONAL PARENTAL CHILD
ABDUCTION 4 (1998) (explaining that the Convention is not "designed to enforce or
provide a decision on custody between parents or other carers"); see also Convention,
supra note 2, at art. 19 ("A decision under this Convention concerning the return of
the child shall not be taken to be a determination on the merits of any custody issue.");
id. at art. 16 (prohibiting a court in the country of refuge from deciding on the merits
of the custody dispute until it has been determined that the child is not to be returned
under the Convention); Perez-Vera, Report, supra note 3, 1 36, at 435 ("[T]he Conven-




B. Removal and Rights of Custody
When a child has been wrongfully removed from his or her habit-
ual residence less than one year prior to the commencement of an ac-
tion under the Convention, a court "shall order the return of the
child forthwith." 19 Removal is "wrongful" if (1) "in breach of rights of
custody attributed to a person, an institution or any other body, either
jointly or alone, under the law of the State in which the child was ha-
bitually resident immediately before the removal"; and (2) "at the
time of removal ... those rights were actually exercised, either jointly
or alone, or would have been so exercised but for the removal or re-
tention., 20 Thus, a petitioner must demonstrate that the respondent
breached custody rights that were both in existence and actually exer-
cised prior to the removal. ICARA places the burden of proving
wrongful removal on the person seeking return of the child.
In addition to the availability of the remedy of return for a re-
moval in breach of custody rights, the Convention provides some pro-
tection for a parent's rights of access to his or her child.2 Article 21
requires signatory nations "to promote the peaceful enjoyment of ac-
cess rights and the fulfilment of any conditions to which the exercise
of those rights may be subject"; in order to fulfill this mission, signato-
ries must "take steps to remove, as far as possible, all obstacles to the
exercise of such rights."22 The protection afforded to access rights is
significantly more limited than that given to custody rights.24
19 Convention, supra note 2, at art. 12. Return is required if proceedings under
the Convention are commenced within one year of the wrongful removal; the court
must order the return of the child if proceedings are commenced more than one year
after the removal unless it is demonstrated that the child is now settled in his or her
new environment. Id.
20 Id. at art. 3(a)-(b).
21 § 11,603(e)(1)(A)
2"Rights of access" are defined to "include the right to take a child for a limited
period of time to a place other than the child's habitual residence." Convention, supra
note 2, at art. 5(b).
23 Id. at art. 21.
24 See PAUL R. BEAUMONT & PETER E. MCELEAvy, THE HAGUE CONVENTION ON
INTERNATIONAL CHILD ABDUCTION 210 (1999) ("[Tlhe Convention does not seek to
regulate [access] rights 'in an exhaustive manner.' Rather the obligations imposed...
are limited, focusing solely on co-operation between Central Authorities and not on
substantive measures aimed at actively upholding access rights."(footnotes omitted)).
A Central Authority is a body designated by a signatory state "to discharge the duties
which are imposed by the Convention." Convention, supra note 2, at art. 6. The Cen-
tral Authorities of the signatory states are directed to "co-operate with each other and
2002]
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The Convention provides limited guidance by virtue of a brief,
nonexhaustive definition regarding "rights of custody." In Article 5,
"rights of custody" are defined as "includ[ing] rights relating to the
care of the person of the child and, in particular, the right to deter-
mine the child's place of residence., 25 Rights of custody protected by
the Convention "may arise in particular by operation of law or by rea-
son of a judicial or administrative decision, or by reason of an agree-
ment having legal effect under the law of' the state of habitual resi-
dence-it is not necessary that custody rights were defined by judicial
decree prior to removal .
Much of the litigation concerning the "rights of custody" .prong
has focused on interpretation of the custody law of the state of habit-
ual residence and on the application of that law to the particular fac-
tual situation before the court. 7 The parties often lack a formal cus-
281tody determination prior to removal, in which case the court must
determine the scope of ex lege custody rights under the law of the
29)state of habitual residence . When one party seeks the remedy of re-
turn, the court must consider the distinction between custody rights
and access rights, since the return remedy is only available following a
breach of custody rights. Where an interim custody order has been
issued by the state of habitual residence, foreign courts have some-
times looked to that order to determine the respective rights of the
promote co-operation amongst the competent authorities in their respective State[s]
to secure the prompt return of children and to achieve the other objects of this Con-
vention." id. at art. 7.
25 Convention, supra note 2, at art. 5(a).
Id. at art. 3; see also Perez-Vera, Report, supra note 3, 68, at 446 (emphasizing
the Convention's protection of "custody rights which were exercised prior to any deci-
sion thereon" and the frequency with which removal occurs prior to any judicial deci-
sion regarding custody).
27 See, e.g., Whallon v. Lynn, 230 F.3d 450, 454-59 (1st Cir. 2000) (reviewing prin-
ciples of Mexican custody law and applying that law to the litigants' dispute); Friedrich
v. Friedrich, 78 F.3d 1060, 1064 (6th Cir. 1996) (outlining German custody law and
finding that the facts demonstrated the left-behind parent had custody rights under
that law); Currier v. Currier, 845 F. Supp. 916, 920-22 (D.N.H. 1994) (applying Ger-
man custody law stating that a marital agreement granting sole custody to one of the
parties is without legal effect until approved by a court order).
28 See BEAUMONT& MCELEAVY, sulpra note 24, at 17-18 & n.13 (reporting that ab-
duction occurs prior to a custody decree in "at least 50% of cases").
29 Ex lege custody rights are those that arise by operation of law, either by statute
or as a matter of common law principles. Id. at 48-49.
30 See, e.g., S. v. H., [1998] Fam. 49, 51, 56 (Fain.) (describing the difference be-
tween custody rights and access rights as "fundamental" because of their differing




parties. An interim order might describe the various responsibilities
and rights of the parties in factual terms, rather than by using terms of
art of the custody law of the state of habitual residence or following
the Convention's use of the terms "custody" and "access."3' This has
created problems for courts determining where the line between
"rights of custody" and "rights of access" lies for Convention pur-
poses-the definitions provided in the Convention text are not ex-
haustive, and predicting how a foreign jurisdiction's custody law
would treat a particular factual situation may be difficult.3 2 The scope
of custody rights protected by the Convention will be discussed in
greater detail in Part III, which analyzes the proper interpretation of
custody rights with respect to interim orders issued prior to a removal
incident.
In order to obtain the return remedy, the left-behind parent must
have possessed custody rights and must have been exercising them
prior to the removal . Determination of whether custody rights were
actually exercised prior to the removal usually involves close consid-
eration of the factual situation of the parties and child as it existed
'443prior to the removal. In Friedrich v. Friedich,3 ' the Sixth Circuit con-
sidered the actions of a child's parents following an abrupt separation,
particularly the petitioner father's contact with and care of the child."!
31 The orders entered by the German court in Shealy v. Shealy, 295 F.3d 1117 (10th
Cir. 2002), discussed infra notes 67-69, are examples.
32 A court considering a petition for return may request a determination from the
"authorities of the State of the habitual residence ... that the removal or retention was
wrongful." Convention, supra note 2, at art. 15. However, this provision does not seem
to be invoked frequently and, given the expeditious treatment of Convention petitions,
doing so more often may be impracticable. See id. at art. 11 (mandating expeditious
proceedings for the return of children and allowing that "[i]f the judicial or adminis-
trative authority concerned has not reached a decision within six weeks from the date
of commencement of the proceedings, the applicant or the Central Authority of the
requested State ... shall have the right to request a statement of the reasons for the
delay").
See id. at art. 3(b) (providing that removal is wrongful if "at the time of removal
or retention [custody rights granted by the state of the child's habitual residence] were
actually exercised, either jointly or alone, or would have been so exercised but for the
removal or retention").
34 Just as the scope of custody rights is determined by reference to the law of the
country of habitual residence, determination of whether a person was exercising his or
her custody rights is made according to the law of the country of habitual residence.
Friedrich v. Friedrich, 983 F.2d 1396, 1402 (6th Cir. 1993).
35 78 F.3d 1060 (6th Cir. 1996).
36 See id. at 1064-69 (considering the contact between the father and child and its
impact on determining the father's exercise of his custody rights). For a more detailed
account of the facts, see Friedrich, 983 F.2d at 1398-99.
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When considering whether the father had been "actually exercising"
his custodial rights at the time of the child's removal, the court stated
that "in the absence of a ruling from a court in the country of habitual
residence, [courts should] liberally find 'exercise' whenever a parent
with dejure custody rights keeps, or seeks to keep, any sort of regular
contact with his or her child. 37 The court offered three reasons for its
broad interpretation of the "actual exercise" element:
First, American courts are not well suited to determine the conse-
quences of parental behavior under the law of a foreign country. It is
fairly easy for the courts of one country to determine whether a person
has custody rights tinder the law of another country. It is also quite pos-
sible for a court to determine if an order by a foreign court awards
someone "custody" rights, as opposed to rights of "access." Far more dif-
ficult is the task of deciding ... if a parent's custody rights should be ig-
nored because he or she was not acting sufficiently like a custodial par-
ent. A foreign court ... should refrain from making such policy-
oriented decisions ....
Second, an American decision about the adequacy of one parent's
exercise of custody rights is dangerously close to forbidden territory: the
merits of the custody dispute....
Third, the confusing dynamics of quarrels and informal separations
make it difficult to assess adequately the acts and motivations of a parent.
An occasional visit may be all that is available to someone left, by the va-
garies of marital discord, temporarily without the child.... Reading too
much into a parent's behavior during these difficult times could be inac-
curate and unfair.... [A]s a general rule, any attempt to maintain a
somewhat regular relationship with the child should constitute "exer-
cise."""
In framing the "actual exercise" element of wrongful removal in
this way, Friedrich created what I will call a "custody plus" paradigm of
wrongful removal, placing more emphasis on the actual possession of
custody rights and less on the exercise of those rights. This paradigm
is sensible because it maintains a broad interpretation of the Conven-
tion-in keeping with the Convention's broad purpose-but does not
render the Convention's inclusion of the "actual exercise" element in
its definition of wrongful removal superfluous.
.7 Friedri, 78 F.3d at 1065.
38 Id. at 1065-66 (footnotes omitted).
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C. Habitual Residence
Habitual residence is a critical component of the Convention, yet
it is not defined in the Convention or in ICARA.3' Instead, a judicial
understanding of the meaning of "habitual residence" has developed
through case law following the seminal construction of the term in
Friedrich.
Friedrich involved a dispute between a mother and father following
the mother's removal of their son from Germany to the United States.
Mrs. Friedrich was an American stationed in Germany with the United
States Army; Mr. Friedrich was a German citizen. 4' The Friedrichs
were married in Germany in 1989, and their son, Thomas, was born in
Germany that year. 4' Except for a ten-day visit with his maternal
grandparents in the United States in 1991, Thomas lived exclusively in
Germany from his birth until his mother removed him when he was
approximately two years old.42
When asked to consider whether the district court properly held
that Thomas's habitual residence was in the United States, the Sixth
Circuit reversed, holding that Germany was Thomas's state of habitual
residence. 43 Despite the fact that Thomas had always resided in Ger-
many, Mrs. Friedrich argued that Thomas's habitual residence was in
the United States because he was a United States citizen, he used a
United States address as his permanent address for the purposes of
military documentation, and Mrs. Friedrich planned for Thomas to
return to the United States with her when she left the military.4 ' The
court of appeals reversed the district court's holding that Thomas's
habitual residence had been altered to the United States when Mrs.
Friedrich and Thomas left the family apartment.5 According to the
Sixth Circuit, a child's habitual residence is determined by reference
to the child's past experience and ordinary residence, not the parents'
39 See Linda Silberman, Hague Convention on International Child Abduction: A Brief
Overview and Case Law Analysis, 28 FAM. L.Q. 9, 20 (1994) ("The Convention does not
provide a definition of habitual residence, but identifying the State of habitual resi-
dence is critical."); see also Friedrich, 983 F.2d at 1400 ("The Convention does not define
'habitual residence."').
40 Friedrich, 983 F.2d at 1398.
41 Id.
42 Id. at 1398-99.
43 Id. at 1398, 1400-02.
44 Id. at 1401.
45 Id.
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future intent.4 " Thus, the habitual residence is the country where the
child is accustomed to living, rather than another country with which
the child has certain legal ties.47 The habitual residence "cannot be so
easily altered" as to change immediately upon the separation of the
child's parents simply because one parent might intend to remove the
48child to another country.
D. Preventing Return
Once the petitioner has established that removal of the child from
his or her habitual residence breached the petitioner's exercised cus-
tody rights, the respondent in a Convention case may avoid the return
remedy either by rebutting the petitioner's case or by proving one of
several exceptions established by the Convention." ' Articles 12, 13,
and 20 provide the exceptions available to the respondent, 5 all of
which are "narrow." '
Under Article 12, a respondent may attempt to prove that a
wrongfully removed child should not be returned to the country of
habitual residence because the child has been in the new country for
more than a year and is settled in his or her new environment. 5 The
46
47 See id. ("Although these ties may be strong enough to establish legal residence
in the United States, they do not establish habitual residence.... On its face, habitual
residence pertains to customary residence .... "); see also Prez-Vera, Report, supra note
3, 1 66, at 445 (stating that the Hague Conference regards the concept of habitual
residence "as a question of pure fact, differing in that respect from domicile").
48 Friedrich, 983 F.2d at 1401.
49 Friedrich described a burden-shifting paradigm in which the petitioner first at-
tempts to prove that the removal of the child was wrongful; if the petitioner is success-
ful, the burden shifts to the respondent to prove one of the exceptions to return pro-
vided by the Convention. Id. at 1400.
50 See supra note 11 (explaining these Convention exceptions).
51 See ICARA, 42 U.S.C. § 11,601 (a) (4) (2000) ("Children who are wrongfully re-
moved or retained ... are to be promptly returned unless one of the narrow exceptions
set forth in the Convention applies." (emphasis added)); Friedrich v. Friedrich, 78
F.3d 1060, 1067 (6th Cir. 1996) ("All four of these exceptions are 'narrow.'" (citation
omitted)); Prez-Vera, Report, supra note 3, 1 34, at 434 ("[The exceptions] are to be
interpreted in a restrictive fashion if the Convention is not to become a dead letter.").
Article 12 provides: "The judicial or administrative authority, even where the
proceedings have been commenced after the expiration of the period of one year
[from the date of wrongful removal] shall also order the return of the child, unless it is
demonstrated that the child is now settled in its new environment." Convention, supra
note 2, at art. 12. For cases construing and applying the "well-settled" exception, see
Miller v. Miller, 240 F.3d 392, 402 n. 14 (4th Cir. 2001); Lops v. Lops, 140 F.3d 927, 945-
46 (11 th Cir. 1998); In re Robinson, 983 F. Supp. 1339, 1344-46 (D. Colo. 1997); Wojcik
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respondent has the burden of proving this exception by a preponder-
ance of the evidence.5 3
Article 13 allows a court to refuse to return the child if the peti-
tioner consented to or subsequently acquiesced in the removal, if re-
turn would expose the child to a "grave risk" of harm or "otherwise
place the child in an intolerable situation," or if, under certain condi-
tions, the child objects to being returned . The respondent has the
burden of proving acquiescence or the objection of the child by a
preponderance of the evidence . The respondent must prove "grave
risk" by clear and convincing evidence .
The final exception to return is found in Article 20 of the Conven-
tion, which provides that return "may be refused if this would not be
permitted by the fundamental principles of the requested state relat-
ing to the protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms.
'
,51
The respondent must prove the applicability of this exception by clear
and convincing evidence. 8
v. Wojcik, 959 F. Supp. 413, 418-21 (E.D. Mich. 1997). See also Legal Analysis, supra
note 11, at 10,509 (discussing the purposes behind, and application of, the "well-
settled" exception).
53 ICARA § 11,603(e) (2) (B).
54 Article 13 provides that return is not required if "the person, institution or
other body having the care of the person of the child ... consented to or subsequently
acquiesced in the removal or retention," Convention, supra note 2, at art. 13(a), or if
"there is a grave risk that his or her return would expose the child to physical or psy-
chological harm or otherwise place the child in an intolerable situation," id. at art.
13(b). In addition, Article 13 permits "the judicial or administrative authority" to "ref-
use to order the return of the child if it finds that the child objects to being returned
and has attained an age and degree of maturity at which it is appropriate to take ac-
count of its views." Id. at art. 13.
55 ICARA § 11,603(e) (2) (B). For cases construing and applying the "acquies-
cence" and "objection of the child" defenses, see, for example, Gonzalez-Caballero v.
Mena, 251 F.3d 789, 793-95 (9th Cir. 2001); Whallon v. Lynn, 230 F.3d 450, 460-61 (1st
Cir. 2000); Robinson, 983 F. Supp. at 1343-44.
56 ICARA § 11,603(e) (2) (A). For cases construing and applying the "grave risk"
exception, see, for example, Blondin v. Dubois, 238 F.3d 153, 157-61 (2d Cir. 2001);
England v. England, 234 F.3d 268, 270-72 (5th Cir. 2000); Friedrich, 78 F.3d at 1067-69;
Nunez-Escudero v. Tice-Menley, 58 F.3d 374, 376-78 (8th Cir. 1995).
57 Convention, supra note 2, at art. 20.
58 ICARA § 11,603(e)(2) (A). For discussion of the "human rights" exception,
which is rarely applied, see BEAUMONT & McELEAVY, supra note 24, at 172-76. See also
Janakakis-Kostun v. Janakakis, 6 S.W.3d 843, 851 (Ky. Ct. App. 1999) (rejecting re-
spondent's "human rights" defense); Prez-Vera, Report, supra note 3, 1 118, at 461-62
(considering the Article 20 "human rights" exception and explaining its "clearly excep-
tional" nature).
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II. MEET THE SHEALYS
Gregory Shealy recently asked a federal court in Colorado to re-
turn his four-year-old daughter, Sierra, to her home in Germany.
59
Mr. Shealy alleged that his wife had removed Sierra from Germany to
the United States without his knowledge or consent and in breach of
his custody rights under German law." , His petition was denied."
Shealy v. Shealy raises interesting questions concerning the proper
treatment of foreign interim custody decisions under the Convention
and will serve as a case study of the applicability of Convention provi-
sions to a case of removal following issue of an interim custody order.
Sierra Hope Shealy was born in 1996 to Gregory and Regina
Shealy, both U.S. citizens. ' Regina Shealy, a sergeant in the United
States Army, was transferred to a duty station in Germany in 1997; Mr.
Shealy and Sierra joined her there soon after. 3 In May 2000, Mr. and
Sergeant Shealy began experiencing marital difficulties, and Mr.
Shealy moved out of the residence he shared with Sergeant Shealy
and Sierra and into a separate apartment.
64
In July 2000, Sergeant Shealy sought a determination from a local
German court that she should have sole legal custody of Sierra.65 The
German court, pursuant to an agreement between Mr. and Sergeant
Shealy, and without conducting a hearing on the merits of the custody
claim, issued an interim order concerning the custody arrangement of
the parties.' The German interim decision, issued July 26, 2000,
awarded Sergeant Shealy "domicil-determination-rights" over Sierra,
but also provided that she would "not be able to take the child from
the German jurisdiction .... [or] to take the child from the Federal
Republi[c] of Germany without the father's consent, unless [m]ilitary
59 Shealy v. Shealy, 295 F.3d 1117, 1120 (10th Cir. 2002).
60 Amended Emergency Petition for Return of Child to Petitioner at 7-8, Shealy v.
Shealy (D. Colo. 2001) (No. 01-D-972) (on file with author).
6 Shealy, 295 F.3d at 1119.
2 Id.
63 Id.
(4 Reporter's Transcript at 174, Shealy v. Shealy (D. Colo. 2001) (No. 01-D-972)
[hereinafter Transcript] (on file with author); Response to Emergency Petition for Re-
turn of Child to Petitioner at 3, Shealy v. Shealy (D. Colo. 2001) (No. 01-D-972) (on
file with author).
65 Transcript, supra note 64, at 174.
66 [d. at 175-76.
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[o]rders make a removal necessary., 67 It further provided that Mr.
Shealy had the right
[t]o have the child.., on every second weekend ... from Thursday
after Kindergarten, at the earliest at 12.00 hrs, until Sunday at 18.00 hrs
(06 p.m.).... The father also have [sic] the rights, to take the child...
daily from Kindergarten at 12.00 hrs until evenings 17.30 hrs (05:30
p.m.) unless there are vacations in the Kindergarten or the mother is on
leave. The parties agree, that the father is permitted to be with the child
68during half of the vacation time.
The court added that "[Sergeant Shealy's] request for the parental
care will not be maintained. '"W The court ordered evaluations of Mr.
Shealy, Sergeant Shealy, and Sierra by social workers; the German
judge planned to determine, based on those evaluations, which parent
was more suitable for permanent custody."'
Sergeant Shealy was scheduled to meet with a social worker on
March 20, 2001; she failed to appear for the meeting, however, be-
cause she removed Sierra from Germany to the United States on
March 19."' When Mr. Shealy discovered that Sierra was missing and
ascertained her location, he brought an action in the District of Colo-
rado requesting that Sierra be returned to Germany pursuant to the
Convention.
III. THE PROBLEM OF INTERIM CUSTODY ORDERS: KEEPING TEMPORARY
ORDERS TEMPORARY
Interim custody orders present an interesting problem under the
Convention because we must determine whether they fall within the
scope of the custody rights protected by the Convention. Considera-
tion of a particular factual scenario like the Shealys' enables us to
imagine other ways in which a similar interim custody order might
play out in the real world, and provides a framework for considering
the policy concerns affecting the outcome.
It does not appear that the proper treatment of an interim cus-
tody order has been directly and fully considered by any court in the
United States. A number of courts have decided Convention petitions
67 Translation, Decision of the Local Court, Idar-Oberstein (Mar. 27, 2001) [here-
inafter Translation of Local Court Decision] (on file with author).
68 Id.
69 Id.
70 Shealy v. Shealy, 295 F.3d 1117, 1120 (10th Cir. 2002).
71 Id.
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when removal of the child followed entry of an interim order in the• 72
country of habitual residence. Some of those cases involved interim
decisions in favor of the left-behind parent-they provide little assis-
tance in resolving the question of whether an interim custody order in
favor of the abducting parent should be considered as having altered
the custody rights of the left-behind parent. Even in those cases that
have involved interim orders from the country of habitual residence
in favor of the abducting parent, however, courts have failed to explic-
itly consider how those orders should affect the left-behind parent's
rights. United States courts should more carefully consider the final-
ity of any custody order before determining whether or not custody
rights have been violated by a removal. Courts faced with a removal
following issuance of an interim order in the country of habitual resi-
dence must develop a consistent, workable theory of both the mean-
ing of custody rights under the Convention and the jurisdictional
rights and responsibilities of the courts in the countries interested in
the child's situation.
The German order at issue in Shealy does not present a pristine is-
sue of proper treatment of interim custody orders because it did not
grant the mother sole custody. Furthermore, proper treatment of the
German court's order raises questions regarding the ne exeat, or non-
removal, clause and the military necessity exception included as con-
ditions of the parties' custody order.73 This contrasts with a hypotheti-
cal interim order explicitly granting temporary sole custody to one
parent and including no nonremoval clause. The outcome in Shealy
raises the question of the interim order's effect on the custody rights
of parties to a Hague Convention petition, a problem that has not yet
72
See, e.g., Higgins v. Higgins, No. 00-CV-6381, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3959, at *4-5
(E.D. Pa. Feb. 2, 2001) (granting a mother's petition for return of her children, who
were removed from Germany by their father following a German court's temporary
custody order in the mother's favor); Turner v. Frowein, 752 A.2d 955, 969-78 (Conn.
2000) (considering a father's petition for return initiated after he had received tempo-
rary custody from a court in the country of habitual residence); Janakakis-Kostun v.
Janakakis, 6 S.W.3d 843, 849, 852 (Ky. Ct. App. 1999) (ordering the return of a child
"wrongfully removed" by the mother who had been granted temporary custody of the
child but ordered not to remove the child from Greece, finding that such prohibition,
coupled with the father's extensive visitation rights, fell within the meaning of "custo-
dial right").
79 The temporary character of the order should be the primary issue, however, as
it seems that one could not determine the effect of the nonremoval clause or the mili-
tary necessity exception until one determines the effectiveness of the order itself. On
appeal, the Tenth Circuit upheld the district court's finding that, because the German
custody order was only temporary, "Mr. Shealy retained joint custody rights that he was
exercising." Shealy, 295 F.3d at 1121.
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received consistent treatment by courts in the United States or other
signatory nations. The following discussion will consider first how in-
terim custody orders should be treated in Convention cases generally,
and then how the Shealy court should have treated the specific Ger-
man order at issue.
Imagine a "typical" situation in which this problem might arise.
Stephanie, a United States citizen, and Andrew, an Australian citizen,
were married in Kentucky and had a child, April, one year after their
marriage. Several months later, the family moved to Australia and
lived there for the next four years, until Andrew and Stephanie began
experiencing marital difficulties. Stephanie filed for divorce in an
Australian court, seeking sole custody of April. Andrew responded by
claiming that he was the more suitable parent, and requested that the
court grant him sole custody instead. The Australian court issued an
interim order, based on an agreement of the parties, under which
Stephanie would have custody of April, but April would spend each
afternoon after preschool with Andrew and would stay with him each
week from Sunday afternoon until Wednesday evening. The court
implemented this arrangement until a full hearing could be held, and
scheduled a series of meetings during which a court-appointed social
worker would meet separately with Stephanie and April and with An-
drew and April in order to evaluate the suitability of each parent. The
court also scheduled a hearing on the merits of the custody dispute to
be held two weeks after the completion of the evaluative meetings.
Andrew attended his first meeting with the social worker. Two days
before Stephanie's first meeting, however, she took April to Colorado,
withdrawing her Australian divorce petition and filing a new divorce
petition in Colorado state court, again seeking sole custody of April.
When Andrew learned of their location several days later, he filed a
petition in district court in Colorado, seeking April's return to Austra-
lia under the Convention. The district court then determined that
April's habitual residence is Australia, but must now decide whether
Stephanie's removal of April was "wrongful" within the meaning of
the Convention. The parties do not dispute that Andrew was very in-
volved in April's care, and that they had been operating under the
terms of the interim order until the time of April's removal from Aus-
tralia.
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A. The Broad Scope of the Convention's Protection of Custody Rights
It is because of the broad scope of the custody rights protected by
the Convention that courts should take into account the temporary
character of an interim foreign custody order. The respondent in a
Convention petition may assert that a foreign temporary order
granted him or her custody of the child as well as terminated the
other parent's rights, and that removal was therefore not wrongful. In
order to accomplish the Convention's goal of protecting a broad
range of custody rights and restoring the status quo that existed prior
to removal, temporary orders should not be seen as altering the cus-
tody rights of the parties. The broad scope of custody rights that the
Convention was intended to protect is evident in the Convention it-
self. Although the Convention states that a finding of wrongful re-
moval should be based on a breach of custody rights attributed by the
74
law of the country of habitual residence, courts and commentators
have interpreted the custody rights protected by the Convention as
not limited to those which may be found under a restrictive interpre-
tation of the family law of the country of habitual residence. 5
1. Source of Custody Rights
The scope of the custody rights protected by the Convention is
wider than the specific family laws of any individual signatory nation,
even those of the country of habitual residence of a child whose re-
turn is being sought. Courts analyzing the meaning of "rights of cus-
tody" under the Convention should look beyond the particular cus-
tody laws of the country of habitual residence to consider the
purposes and structure of the Convention itself. As the English Family
Division observed in Re W:
"The key concepts which determine the scope of the Convention are
not dependent for their meaning on any single legal system. Thus the
expression 'rights of custody,' for example, does not coincide with any
74 Convention, supra note 2, at art. 3(a).
75 See infra note 79 (providing authority in support of a broad reading of custody
rights).
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particular concept of custody in domestic law, but draws its meaning
from the definitions, structure and purposes of the Convention.
" 76
The dual nature of the custody rights protected by the Conven-
tion, which draws meaning from the custody laws of the country of
habitual residence as well as from the Convention itself, has been simi-
larly articulated elsewhere. For example, the court in C. v. C., review-
ing a petition for return by an Australian father whose child had been
removed from Australia to England by the child's mother, stated:
We are necessarily concerned with Australian law because we are bid-
den by [Article 3] to decide whether the removal of the child was in
breach of "rights of custody" attributed to the father either jointly or
alone under that law, but it matters not in the least how those rights are
described in Australian law. What matters is whether those rights fall
within the [C]onvention definition of "rights of custody." Equally, it
matters not in the least whether those rights would be regarded as rights
of custody under English law, if they fall within the 
definition.
77
In other words, courts should look to the law of the country of habit-
ual residence to determine the factual substance of parties' rights with
respect to the child-whether, for example, an unmarried father has
the right to determine which school his child should attend, or
whether a mother has the right to have the child stay in her home
three nights per week following a divorce-but should decide whether
those rights constitute custody rights that are protected by the Con-
vention according to the meaning of "rights of custody" under the
Convention itself.
7 8
76 [1998] 2 F.L.R. 146, 151-52 (Fam.) (quoting Report of the Second Commission Meet-
ing to Review the Operation of the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction Held 18-21
January 1993,33 I.L.M. 225 (1994)).
7 [1989] All E.R. 465, 473 (C.A. 1988) (Lord Donaldson).
78 Professor Silberman has stated that the Convention creates "an autonomous
treaty definition of custody rights quite apart from domestic law interpretations of cus-
tody, which may differ from State to State." Silberman, supra note 39, at 17. The Eng-
lish Court of Appeal has described the dual inquiry into custody rights another way,
explaining that the inquiry is whether the left-behind parent has custody rights under
the law of the country of habitual residence that fall within the Convention's definition
of custody rights. If so, the court in the country to which the child has been removed
determines whether the removal breached those rights of custody. See Re F, [1995]
Fam. 224, 231 (C.A.) ("Having found that the father retains rights as a parent by Colo-
rado law which fall within the Convention definition .... equally it is a matter of Eng-
lish law whether the mother is in breach of those 'rights of custody' by her removal of
the child.").
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2. Broad Scope of Custody Rights
Rights of custody under the Convention are to be interpreted
broadly,79 in part because a "flexible interpretation of the terms used
[in the Convention] ... allows the greatest possible number of cases
to be brought into consideration."" A court's interpretation of the
effect of an interim foreign custody decision must account for the ex-
pansive nature of the custody rights protected by the Convention.
The fact that a court in the country of habitual residence may have
granted the abducting parent certain custody rights pending addi-
tional investigation or evaluations, or a final hearing on the merits of
the custody dispute, should not be dispositive of the parties' respective
custody rights. The court should instead look to the factual circum-
stances prior to removal and to the purposes of the Convention in de-
79 Compare Croll v. Croll, 229 F.3d 133, 146 (2d Cir. 2000) (Sotomayor, J., dissent-
ing) (describing the Convention as containing a "broad notion of custody rights" and a
"notably more expansive conception of custody rights" than would be derived from an
interpretation based on a dictionary definition of "custody"), with id. at 139 ("Nothing
in the Hague Convention suggests that the drafters intended anything other than [an]
ordinary [dictionary] understanding of custody."). See generally BEAUMONT &
MCELEAVY, supra note 24, at 45 ("The drafters and subsequently judicial and adminis-
trative authorities have sought to avoid potential lacunae by seeking to give a wide in-
terpretation to custody rights."); Merle H. Weiner, International Child Abduction and the
Escape from Domestic Violence, 69 FORDHAM L. REv. 593, 636-41 (2000) (discussing the
expansive nature of the Convention's use of the term "rights of custody" and stating
that the term "has consistently received a wide interpretation"); Deborah M. Huynh,
Note, Croll v. Croll: Can Rights of Access Ever Merit a Remedy of Return Under the Hague
Convention?, 26 N.C.J. INT'L L. & COM. RFG. 529, 551-52 (2001) (opining that "under-
standing the expansive meaning of 'custody' is fundamental," and describing the Con-
vention's concept of custody as "open-ended," "broad," and "inclusive").
The Pdrez-Vera report explains that the sources of custody rights under the law of
the country of habitual residence should be "understood in [their] widest sense, as
embracing both written and customary rules of law-whatever their relative impor-
tance might be-and the interpretations placed upon them by case law." Perez-Vera,
Report, supra note 3, 1 66, at 445. In addition, the Explanatoy Report observes:
[A]s the preliminary proceedings of the Commission demonstrate, [the lan-
guage of Article 3] was intended right from the start to expand considerably
the range of provisions which have to be considered .... [A] proposal was
made during the Fourteenth Session that this article should make it clear that
the reference to the law of the habitual residence extends also to the rules of
private international law. The fact that this proposal was rejected was due to
the Conference's view that its inclusion was unnecessary and became implicit
anyway once the text neither directly nor indirectly excluded the rules in
question.
Id. 1 66, at 445-46 (footnotes omitted).
80 Perez-Vera, Report, supra note 3, 67, at 446.
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termining whether the left-behind parent had rights of custody within
the meaning of the Convention.
B. Suggested Analytical Approaches to Interim Orders
Assigning too much weight to an interim order favoring the ab-
ductor undermines the Convention's purposes of preventing unilat-
eral changes in the forum of custody disputes and deterring interna-
tional child abductions. A parent who had been exercising custody
under the laws of the habitual residence since the child's birth, but
who had agreed to allow the other parent to have interim custody
pending evaluation by the court, might lose all his or her rights the
moment the other parent moved the child across an international
boundary. However, giving no weight to an interim custody decision
would mean that a left-behind parent who had not previously had any
custody rights with respect to a child, but had obtained custody based
on an interim decision of the country of habitual residence prior to
the removal, would never have access to the remedy of return under
the Convention. The proper resolution of this dilemma cannot be
that a court should decide to give effect to, or to ignore, an interim
decision based solely on whether the interim decision granted or
withdrew custody rights from the petitioner. Instead, an appropriate
result may be achieved by either of two analytical approaches to an in-
terim custody decision's effect on the respective custody rights of par-
ties to a Convention petition: (1) the court may view the situation in
the light most favorable to a finding of custody rights held by the left-
behind parent, in order to effect a full consideration of the abduction
claim and to comport with the purposes of the Convention; or (2) the
court may view the interim decision as an undertaking of jurisdiction
by the court in the country of habitual residence, or as a determina-
tion that the custody decision should be made there, and grant defer-
ence to the foreign court's action.
1. Viewing Custody Rights in the Light Most Favorable to the
Left-Behind Parent
The first approach-viewing the preremoval factual and legal
situation in the light most favorable to a finding that the left-behind
parent had "rights of custody" prior to the removal-derives its sup-
port primarily from the purposes and policies behind the Convention
and ICARA, and effects a full consideration of the practical realities of
the parties' family situation prior to the removal.
2002]
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The Convention was adopted as a measure of protection for chil-
dren like April, in the hypothetical scenario above, against the harm-
ful effects of international child abduction." In my hypothetical, the
Colorado court decided that Australia was April's habitual residence.
April's father and mother shared the rights and responsibilities of car-
ing for April in the country of habitual residence until the time of
their separation and, subsequently, according to the terms of the in-
terim order. If the Colorado court were to decide that the interim
order should be viewed as vesting sole custody in Stephanie and abro-
gating Andrew's custody rights, April's ties with her familiar environ-
ment and with her father may be permanently severed, resulting in
the type of harm that occurs when children are internationally ab-
ducted. This would be a drastic result to impose on a child, based
solely on an interim order in which the Australian court had not yet
had the opportunity to consider the merits of competing custody
claims.
Similarly, treating the interim order as if it nullified Andrew's cus-
tody rights would undermine a number of the other purposes under-
lying the Convention's adoption. The deterrent effects"3 of the inter-
national return remedy would certainly be frustrated. Courts often
enter some type of provisional order pending a final custody decision.
If United States courts were known to treat such an order as a final
custody determination when considering whether removal was wrong-
ful under the Convention, the United States would become a haven
for parents wishing to avoid the jurisdiction of foreign courts over
their custody disputes through international abduction. Parents
would need only file a request for custody with the foreign court and
obtain an interim decision, with no consideration of the merits, in
their favor in order to have that decision effectively validated and fi-
814nalized by a unilateral move to the United States. Reducing the steps
81 See supra note 13 and accompanying text (describing such protection as one of
the Convention's primary purposes).
82 See, for example, ReB, [1995] 2 F.C.R. 505, 518-19 (C.A.), in which an English
court determined that "the child ... would suffer if his expectation of returning to the
only country he had ever known ... was destroyed." See also id. at 517 ("The objective
is to spare children already suffering the effects of [a] breakdown in their parents' re-
lationship the further disruption which is suffered when they are taken arbitrarily by
one parent from their settled environment and moved to another country ... ").
3 See supra note 15 and accompanying text (explaining the Convention's deter-
rent function).
84 Ultimately, the left-behind parent might still obtain custody because, following
the refusal of return, a custody determination on the merits might be requested in the
United States. There is no requirement, however, that a judicial custody decision be
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necessary before removal will be considered "rightful" makes it easier
for parents to remove children from one country to another and
therefore reduces the deterrent effect of the Convention.
The Convention's purposes of preventing forum-shopping and
unilateral custody alterationss would also suffer by according an in-
terim order the same status as a final order. Permitting a parent to
obtain an interim order from a foreign court and then withdraw from
that jurisdiction and invoke the jurisdiction of another nation in the
custody matter would allow the parent to "test the waters" of various
nations' custody laws, and their courts' perspectives on the situation,
before deciding to battle in one of the jurisdictions. For example,
Stephanie might have acquired knowledge of the approach and de-
meanor of the Australian judge at the initial hearing. She could even
have attended several meetings with the social worker to determine
whether or not the social worker would be sympathetic to Stephanie's
position or to discover what April would tell the evaluator about their
relationship and that of April and Andrew. If, after participating in
and observing the various proceedings, she were uncertain about her
chances of success, or felt that her chances were better in her own
country of origin than in that of her estranged husband, Stephanie
could have taken April abroad, unilaterally giving greater effect to the
court's interim order than the court intended.
In Re J, the English Court of Appeal decided that a married fa-
ther's ex lege joint legal custody rights under Colorado law were not
eliminated for Convention purposes when his wife, the child's
mother, acquired an interim custody order and then removed the
child from the United States. ' In that case, an American father and a
Welsh mother had married in Colorado and lived there with their
son.8 7 When the marriage began to deteriorate, the mother obtained
an interim custody order from a Colorado court and then removed
the child to Wales. s The father petitioned for return under the Con-
vention."9 The Court of Appeal determined that the father and
made if neither party requests one, and the balance of power would likely have shifted
in the abductor's favor. See supra note 17 (discussing the legal advantage obtained by
the abducting parent by virtue of selecting the forum in which the custody dispute will
be ad.judicated).
.Y See supra notes 16-17 and accompanying text (outlining these two Convention
goals).
[1995] Fam. 224, 230 (C.A.).
87 Id. at 227.
88 Id.
89 Id. at 228.
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mother had "equal and separate rights of custody" under Colorado
law at the time of removal, and that either parent could unilaterally
remove the child from Colorado without violating Colorado law.9
Nevertheless, the court concluded that "lawful removal" by one parent
could not destroy the other parent's custody rights, and that the
mother's removal of the child breached the father's custody rights be-
cause he was prevented from exercising those rights in the United
States;" The court held that this constituted a wrongful removal
within the meaning of the Convention.1 The court further held that
the removal breached the father's rights, despite the existence of the
interim order in the mother's favor-the order was "of a limited na-
ture," did not abrogate the father's custody rights because it did not
destroy the father's right to decide that his child should live within the
United States, and did not alter the fact that the father would have
been exercising his rights of custody had the child not been removed
by the mother: '
The court's decision that the removal was wrongful was grounded
entirely on its finding of breach of the father's custody rights; since
the court held that removal was wrongful because of that breach, it
did not reach the question of whether the Colorado court had custody
rights by virtue of the proceedings pending there at the time of re-
moval. 4 The court determined that the removal breached the father's
rights under the Convention because of
the mother's unilateral decision to remove the child without the consent
of the father and with the knowledge that if he knew he would have op-
posed her removal of the child. By the removal she frustrated and ren-
dered nugatory his equal and separate rights of custody, in particular
that the child should reside in the [United States]. In so doing she
was.., in breach of the father's rights of custody under the Convention
and the removal was wrongful.'5
By taking this approach, the court correctly balanced the father's
and mother's respective rights under Colorado custody law and the
protection offered by the Convention for a broad range of ways in
90 Id. at 230.
91 Id.
92 Id. at 231.
93 Id. at 230.
Id. at 231. See infra Part III.B.2.b for a discussion of decisions in which courts
have held that removal was wrongful because it breached custody rights held by a court
in the country of habitual residence by virtue of pending custody proceedings in that
court.
95 ReI, [1995] Fam. at 231.
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which custody rights may be held and exercised. The decision was
soundly based on the principles behind the Convention's adoption
and represents a pragmatic approach to the complex legal and factual
situations surrounding international child abductions.
In my hypothetical, Stephanie and Andrew had joint legal custody
until the interim order was entered. In addition, both were highly in-
volved in April's care and upbringing, both before and after an in-
terim decision that was not made on the mefits of the case. Viewing
the situation in the light most favorable to a finding that Andrew had
and was exercising custody rights prior to the removal would give ap-
propriate weight to the parties' respective custody rights; there is no
reason that the form of an interim decision should trump the sub-
stance of the pre-existing legal rights of the parties and their actual re-
lationships and behavior, both before and during the interim ar-
rangement. Andrew, Stephanie, and April had lived in Australia for
most of April's life; the parents had cared for April in Australia, and
she was accustomed to her way of life there. It is absurd for an alien
court to determine custody based on the problematic premise that a
provisional remedy of a court that has undertaken to evaluate the
child's best interests (but has not yet had a full opportunity to do so)
alters the factual and legal situation of the parties in any meaningful
way under the Convention. The court should return the child, ena-
bling the court whose jurisdiction the parties originally invoked and
which has the closest connection to the situation to appropriately
complete what it began.
2. Deference to Foreign Courts
The second approach-viewing the foreign interim decision as an
acceptance of jurisdiction by the foreign court or as a determination
that the custody decision should be made there-derives support
from the Convention's purposes, cases holding that an interim order
vests rights of custody in the foreign court itself, and principles of
comity.
a. The Convention's policies
The purposes of the Convention support this approach in the
same way they support an approach in which the foreign court mean-
ingfully considers the actual factual and legal circumstances of the
parties prior to removal rather than accepting interim orders at face
2002]
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value" Deferring to a foreign court's acceptance of custody might
create concerns that a court would too easily abdicate its responsibility
to protect the child's interests to a foreign court that was itself im-
properly exercising jurisdiction over the initial custody dispute, such
as where a previous abduction had occurred or where an interim cus-
tody determination was secured during a temporary visit to the for-
eign nation. However, the habitual residence requirement should
serve to allay any such concern. Custody rights are defined by refer-
ence to the laws of the country of habitual residence and habitual
residence is determined by the domestic court.9' There would be no
need to defer to an interim order from a third-party nation that did
not itself have proper jurisdiction over the custody claim.98
b. The foreign court's custody rights
A number of courts have indicated that the nature of an interim
custody order is such that, until final custody arrangements are made
by the court, rights of custody are vested in the foreign court itself,
and that these rights may be violated by removal prior to final disposi-
tion of the case. No United States court had considered the issue un-
96 See supra notes 80-84 and accompanying text for a discussion of how the Con-
vention's policies support an approach based on a practical view of the parties' factual
circumstances prior to removal.
97 See Convention, supra note 2, at art. 3(a) (providing that wrongful removal or
retention is determined under the law of the state in which the child was habitually
resident); see also supzra notes 76-80 and accompanying text (discussing the scope and
source of the custody rights protected by the Convention).
98 Professor Eekelaar addressed this concern when the Convention was still in
draft form:
A clear ground of challenge would be that the "foreign" order was not the
kind of order contemplated by the procedure. Here it is necessary to refer to
the basis on which the original court exercised jurisdiction.... Would it be
enough if the original state was the state of the child's nationality, or [his or
her] mere presence, or domicile and so on?. . . [T]he concept of "habitual
residence" seems to be the most appropriate. Thus if it could be shown that
the original decision was not made in the state of the child's habitual resi-
dence at the time the proceedings leading to the decision were instituted, it
should not be entitled to automatic enforcement under this procedure.
Eekelaar, supra note 14, at 211. Return may be made to a country other than that of
the habitual residence, for example, if the parent requesting return has emigrated fol-
lowing the removal. Prez-Vera, Report, supra note 3, 1 110, at 459-60. The petitioner's
relocation following the child's removal does not affect the custody rights determina-
tion at the time of removal. Custody rights form the basis for a finding of wrongful
removal, and, under Article 3, the determination of custody rights requires reference
to the laws of the cotntry of habitual residence, not to that of a third-party country act-
ing improperly with respect to the child.
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til recently,99 but the courts of several other signatory nations have
faced the issue. Where courts have decided that a foreign court had
custody rights under the Convention, the decisions turn on the in-
volvement of the foreign court in custody proceedings and acceptance
ofjurisdiction by that court.
It has been widely accepted that a court is a body that may have
custody rights under the Convention. '0 The issue thus becomes
whether the foreign court in any particular case had acquired those
rights prior to the removal. A court's custody rights may arise from its
power to decide others' rights of custody in a custody dispute con-
cerning the child, or from a determination that the court had the
"right to determine the child's place of residence."'0 '
One case in which the court decided that a court itself had cus-
tody rights was Re H,102 a case involving an application by a father for
return of his child to Ireland. The child had been removed by his
mother to England in the midst of a custody dispute in an Irish court.
The mother had been granted custody, and the father interim access,
in 1996. 103 In 1998, the father filed an application for custody; at the
initial hearing the Irish court adjourned the matter for four months
99 The Western District of Virginia recently expressed its belief that no court in
the United States had previously addressed the issue of whether a foreign court had
custody rights under the Convention. Fawcett v. McRoberts, 168 F. Supp. 2d 595, 603
(W.D. Va. 2001).
100 See Re H, [2000] 2 A.C. 291, 299-306 (H.L.) (appeal taken from Ir.) (collecting
cases from numerous countries, including England, Ireland, Canada, and New Zea-
land, which held that a court may have custody rights with respect to a child, and stat-
ing that neither the court nor a report on the operation of the Convention had found
any contrary decisions); see also Convention, supra note 2, at art. 3(a) (providing that
removal is wrongful when it breaches "rights of custody attributed to a person, an insti-
tution or any other body" (emphasis added)).
101 Convention, supra note 2, at art. 5(a). See Thonuon v. Thomson, [1994] 3 S.C.R.
551, 588, for the Canadian Supreme Court's discussion of how custody rights may vest
in a court, without any requirement that the court be exercising its "wardship" jurisdic-
tion. The court held:
[W]hen a court has before it the issue of who shall be accorded custody of a
child, and awards interim custody to one of the parents in the course of deal-
ing with that issue, it has rights relating to the care and control of the child
and, in particular, the right to determine the child's place of residence. It
has long been established that a court may be a body or institution capable of
caring for the person of a child.... [T]he Court of Chancery has long exer-
cised wardship over children in need of protection in the exercise of its parens
patriaejurisdiction. But I see no need to rely on jurisdiction emanating from
this doctrine ....
Id.
102 [2000] 2 A.C. 291 (H.L.).
103 Id. at 300.
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after the parties consented to an interim custody and access arrange-
ment."" The House of Lords held that the Irish court had custody
rights with respect to the child because its jurisdiction over the cus-
tody dispute had been invoked, a date for disposition of the matter




In another English case, Re W,10'" a left-behind father sought a dec-
laration of wrongful removal tinder the Convention.' 7 The father had
initially petitioned for custody of his two children in 1996. In early
1997, the mother and father provisionally agreed that the father
would have contact with the children for several months, after which a
court welfare officer would enter a report and the court would hold a
final hearing on the request for custody. A few days before the final
hearing date, the mother and stepfather took the children to Austra-
lia, intending to remain there. Upon consideration of the Article 15
request, the Family Division concluded that removal had been wrong-
ful within the meaning of the Convention because it breached the
custody rights of the court with "relevant proceedings pending" in the
original custody dispute. 8 The court added that "proceedings will
obviously be pending for this purpose if interim orders have been
made and directions given for a final hearing.',lo
104 Id.
Id. at 304-05. The court also addressed whether the father had standing to
bring the Convention petition if he did not have rights of custody but the Irish court
did. The court held that "the application for the restoration of the child should be
made by the person whose application to the court conferred on it a right of custody
rather than the court itself having to undertake that responsibility." Id. at 306.
106 [1998] 2 F.L.R. 146 (Fain.).
107 Article 15 provides:
The judicial or administrative authorities of a Contracting State may, prior to
the making of an order for the return of the child, request that the applicant
obtain from the authorities of the State of the habitual residence of the child
a decision or other determination that the removal ... was wrongful within
the meaning of Article 3 of the Convention ....
Convention, supra note 2, at art. 15.
108 Re W, [1998] 2 F.L.R. at 160-62.
109 Id. at 162. In support of her decisionJudge Hale relied on an earlier Court of
Appeal case and found that, "'[h]aving made what is no more than an interim custody
order, the Ontario court, in my judgment, retained what Article 5(a) of the Hague
Convention calls "the rights to determine the child's place of residence ."" Re W,
[19981 2 F.L.R. at 159 (quoting Re B, [1997] F.L.R. 594, 600 (C.A.) (Swinton Thomas,
L.J.) (quoting B. v. B., [1993] Faro. 32, 42 (C.A.) (Leggatt, L.J.))). She also quoted
from Re B, [1998] 2 F.C.R. 212, 219 (C.A.), in which the court had stated that "as an
interim custody order had been made, so rights of custody remain in the court." Re W,
[1998] 2 F.L.R. at 159-60.
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One court in the United States has acknowledged that the exis-
tence of a pending custody case may confer custody rights on a court
itself, rights that may be breached in turn by removal." ° In Fawcett v.
McRoberts, a federal court in the Western District of Virginia held that
a father who removed his child from Scotland to the United States in
the midst of an ongoing custody battle breached the custody rights of
the Scottish sheriff court with jurisdiction over the initial custody dis-
pute.' The court observed that "by participating in the sheriff court
proceedings... Mr. McRoberts understood the role of the sheriff
court in adjudicating the dispute between himself and his former wife,
and can not now deny [that court's] interest in this case."" 2 The court
found Re H particularly persuasive in reaching this result.' 3 In addi-
tion, the court declined to follow Croll v. Croll,14 rejecting the Second
Circuit's restrictive interpretation of custody rights' 5 and distinguish-
ing the facts on the grounds that Croll involved a permanent order of
the Hong Kong court, while Fawcett involved a removal "in the midst
of pending proceedings in which the only order issued was not fi-
nal..".6  The interim nature of a foreign order cannot be ignored
when deciding whether removal from the country of habitual resi-
dence breached the custody rights of another person or court.
The distinction between permanent and interim orders has been
made elsewhere. The majority in Croll decided that a ne exeat
clause' 7 in a permanent foreign custody order did not confer custody
rights on the noncustodial parent that would warrant return of a child
under the Convention; the court expressly distinguished certain for-
eign cases in which return had been ordered on the basis that "tempo-
rary custody" had been "conditioned on non-removal of the child
pending further proceedings."' s In dissent, Judge Sotomayor rejected
the distinction between interim and final orders; her opinion, how-
110 See Fawcett v. McRoberts, 168 F. Supp. 2d 595, 603 (W.D. Va. 2001) ("While the
question of whether a court has been held to have 'rights of custody,' appears not to
have been addressed in the courts of the United States, it has been before the tribunals
of our co-signatory Nations.").
ill ld. at 603, 606.
12 Id. at 603.
113 See id. at 603-04 (reviewing Re Hat length with approval).
114 229 F.3d 133 (2d Cir. 2000).
115 Fawcett, 168 F. Supp. 2d at 604-06.
16 Id. at 606.
117 See infra notes 158-59 and accompanying text for further development of the
role played by ne exeat clauses within the Convention's scheme of custody rights.
R Croll, 229 F.3d at 143 (emphasis added).
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ever, must be understood in the context of her conclusion that the
child's removal was wrongful because it breached the nonremoval
clause in the foreign custody order. She expressed her belief that a ne
exeat clause should be enforced whether contained in an interim or
final order:
I am unpersuaded by the argument that ne exeat clauses in permanent
non-removal orders relate solely to access rights .... Nor do I consider
significant the.., distinction between interim and permanent custody
orders. To be sure, a court issuing an interim custody order has a strong
interest in preventing a child's removal before it has the opportunity to
make its final custody determination. But nothing in the Convention's
language or official history supports the notion that this interest is any
more important than the court's interest in enforcing the final custody
order once issued. The dichotomy between an interim and permanent
custody order is, therefore, for the purposes of the Convention, a dis-
tinction without a difference.
... I would [find] that rights arising under a ne exeat clause consti-
tute "rights of custody" for the purposes of the Hagtie Convention.
1 9
Judge Sotomayor rejected the distinction between permanent and
interim orders in order to implement a more expansive view of the
custody fights of the left-behind parent, an interpretation that would
recognize custody rights for the left-behind parent despite a permanent
custody order in the abductor's favor. Judge Sotomayor, if distin-
guishing between permanent and temporary custody orders without
nonremoval clauses, would likely apply her expansive view of custody
rights. The result would be that the interim, rather than permanent,
nature of the order would be a "distinction with a difference," leading
to return of the child for a final custody decision in the country of ha-
bitual residence. This result suggests that if some aspect of the in-
terim order, whether it be the inclusion of a ne exeat clause or simply
the order's temporary character, leaves jurisdiction in the foreign fo-
rum or confers some residue of custody rights on the left-behind par-
ent, then the child should be returned.
These cases reflect the idea that a court obtains custody rights
when it has jurisdiction over a pending custody case because it is em-
powered to determine'the child's place of residence.20 Removal of a
child by a parent with an interim custody order in his or her favor
IM) Id. at 152-53 (SotomayorJ., dissenting).
120 See aLho Re W, [1998] 2 F.L.R. 146, 158-61 (Fain.) (quoting a series of cases
holding that a court in the country of habitual residence had custody rights because it




breaches the issuing court's custody rights and is actionable under the
Convention on that basis.' 2' Therefore, the question of whether an
interim custody order in favor of the abducting parent eliminates the
left-behind parent's custody rights merely begins the wrongful-
removal inquiry. A court hearing a Convention petition must then
consider whether the court in the country of habitual residence, by
undertaking to resolve the custody dispute, itself acquired custody
rights that were breached by removal and warrant the remedy of re-
turn.
C. The Foreign Court's Acceptance ofJurisdiction
A determination that the foreign court had custody rights is suffi-
cient to warrant return, but is not necessary to that result. The for-
eign interim custody order represents the foreign court's acceptance
of jurisdiction, and demonstrates that court's intent to decide the
case. 122 This is sufficient to warrant return. The Convention expresses
a preference that custody disputes be resolved in the country of the
child's habitual residence and the preremoval status quo restored.
2
3
The preremoval status quo encapsulates the legal rights of the parties,
the family relationships, and the actual living experience of the child.
"[T]he conduct [that constitutes wrongful removal] is that which
changes the family relationships which existed before or after any ju-
dicial decision, by using a child and thus turning [him or her] into an
instrument and principal victim of the situation., 124 When proceed-
ings have begun in the habitual residence's court system, the legal
situation is clearly in flux-since the Convention preserves both legal
and practical alignments, an interim order should not alter the par-
121 SeeThomson v. Thomson, [1994] 3 S.C.R. 551, 588 (Can.) ("[W]hen a court is
vested with jurisdiction to determine who shall have custody of a child, it is while in the
course of exercising that jurisdiction, exercising rights of custody within the broad
meaning of the term contemplated by the Convention.").
122 See Eekelaar, supra note 14, at 212 ("Interim orders made after proceedings
have commenced in the original state.., represent a holding operation. It seems that,
on principle, only decisions made after proper hearing should be entitled to automatic
enforcement." (emphasis added)).
123 See Friedrich v. Friedrich, 78 F.3d 1060, 1064 (6th Cir. 1996) ("[T]he Hague
Convention is generally intended to restore the pre-abduction status quo and to deter
parents from crossing borders in search of a more sympathetic court."); Prez-Vera,
Report, supra note 3, 16, at 429 ("The Convention, in order to [deprive the abductor's
actions of any practical or juridical consequences,] places at the head of its objectives
the restoration of the status quo .... (citations omitted)).
124 Prez-Vera, Report, supra note 3, 57, at 442.
,2002]
650 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LA W REVIEW
ties' respective rights under the Convention. Instead, the child should
be returned to the country of habitual residence, restoring the pre-
removal factual status quo in order to await final disposition, on the
merits, of the parties' legal rights.
In 1980, with the Convention in draft form, Professor Eekelaar
prepared a review of the existing jurisprudence of international child
abduction cases in British Commonwealth and United States courts in
order to evaluate the Convention and another proposal to remedy the
parental abduction problem, concluding that the Convention was the
more desirable alternative.' His analysis drew distinctions among
abduction cases in which no custody decision had been made in the
country of habitual residence; those in which proceedings had begun
but had not been completed, including where interim orders had
been made; and those in which a final order had been issued. 26 Tra-
ditionally, a court hearing a case involving international parental child
abduction preferred to decide the merits of the custody dispute itself,
despite the existence of a foreign custody order, because deference to
a foreign court was considered to be a "delegation" of the court's duty
to form its own judgment about the child's best interests. 2 1 In the
mid-1960s, a new approach began to develop. 12  According to the
"Cross principle," the court in the country of refuge should "'pay re-
gard to the orders of the proper foreign court, unless [it] is satisfied
beyond reasonable doubt that to do so would inflict serious harm on
the child. ' ' '" 22 Courts that followed the Cross principle relied on the
fact that a foreign court had already taken jurisdiction of the matter.1
'M
125 Eekelaar, sup/ra note 14, at 219-23.
126 Id. at 200-18.
127 See id. at 199-200 (surveying early twentieth-century cases in which courts
elected to retry custody disputes instead of returning the child to the country of habit-
ual residence for further proceedings).
128 Id. at 200.
121 d. at 201 (quoting Re E.(D.), [1967] Ch. 287, 289 (Ch.) (Cross,].)).
13 See id. at 202 ("[A]s between two courts of co-ordinate jurisdiction, one in this
country and the other in [the habitual residence], prima facie the right course is for
the matter to be investigated in the [court in the country of habitual residence,] which
had seisin of the matter before these proceedings began .... " (citations omitted)); see
aLvo id. at 206 (reviewing pre-Conventionjurisprudence in situations where foreign cus-
tody proceedings had been initiated at the time of removal, and indicating courts'
"strong inclination to order the child to be returned to the jurisdiction of the court
which is already seised of the matter").
Courts were less likely to follow the foreign order if it was not based on the child's
best interests. See id. (citing "exceptional" cases where courts declined to return chil-
dren to the state of habitual residence because of fears for the children's safety). In-
terim orders generally are not "based on a full assessment of the child's interests." Id.
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In developing an international framework for dealing with abduc-
tion cases, Professor Eekelaar suggested that if a custody proceeding
had begun in the country of habitual residence, the child should be
returned to "the jurisdiction in which it was commenced," unless (1)
that jurisdiction had not been properly invoked;"' (2) the law of the
country of habitual residence did not apply the best interests of the
child principle to child custody cases; or (3) return would be "seri-
ously detrimental" to the child. 132 He thought that the Convention
satisfied all of these requirements except the second. He decided that
the negative implications of failing to satisfy this one requirement
were reduced by the fact that "the scheme is not one of enforcing the




Finally, my second analytical approach-in which domestic courts
should defer to the foreign court's acceptance of jurisdiction in cases
involving foreign interim orders-is supported by principles of com-
ity. A number of courts have acknowledged some distinction between
an interim and a final custody order. 13 4 The distinction should be
Thus, in pre-Convention jurisprudence, not recognizing the foreign custody order
meant that the court in the country of refuge would hear the merits of the custody dis-
pute rather than ordering the child's return. See id. at 199-200, 203 (reviewing cases in
which a court, declining to return the child despite the existence of a foreign custody
order, itself decided the child's best interests). The Convention alters the analysis be-
cause it requires return to the country of habitual residence unless the custody rights
of the left-behind parent have not been breached. Instead of considering the merits of
the case in the country of refuge when an interim order is not recognized, the court
should look to the pre-order rights of the parties to determine whether custody rights
existed and, if so, order the return of the child.
131 See supra notes 97-98 and accompanying text (discussing the role of habitual
residence in ensuring that the foreign jurisdiction was properly invoked).
132 Eekelaar, supra note 14, at 211-12.
133 Id. at 219.
134 For example, when the respondent in Tabacchi v. Harrison, No. 99 C 4130, 2000
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1518 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 8, 2000), moved to dismiss the case on the basis
that an Italian court had already granted her temporary custody, the American court
dismissed her argument out of hand, stating: "[T]he Italian court's decision did not
involve a final resolution of custody but merely granted Harrison temporary custody,
'without prejudice to the necessity and the urgency of an in depth technical evaluation
of the parental fitness of both parties ....' Id. at *26 n.5. The Supreme Court of
Canada has also acknowledged that the outcome of a Convention case might differ
when based on an interim order from that in a case in which a permanent custody or-
der had been issued: "It will be observed that I have underlined the purely interim
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more universally recognized, and should be explicitly applied by
courts hearing petitions for return when the question of wrongful re-
moval arises. Common law principles of comity allow this result be-
cause an interim order does not represent a final judgment of the for-
eign court.
Courts in the country of refuge are not required to give full effect
to a foreign judgment.13"5 Under general principles of comity, how-
ever, U.S. courts do accord some degree of deference to foreign
judgments. Comity is a matter of discretionary deference to the laws
or judgments of foreign jurisdictions, founded on "international duty
and convenience" and mutual respect. 136 In recognition of principles
of comity, courts have given a great degree of deference to the deci-
sions of foreign courts in Convention cases.' 7 Deference to a foreign
interim custody order, however, might take the form of deferring to
the temporary nature of the order, and not simply to its terms. ,
nature of the mother's custody .... I would not wish to be understood as saying the
approach should be the same in a situation where a court inserts a non-removal clause
in a permanent order of custody." Thomson v. Thomson, [1994] 3 S.C.R. 551, 589; see
also supra notes 110-16 and accompanying text (discussing the weight given to a foreign
interim custody order in Fawcett v. McRoberts, 168 F. Supp. 2d 595 (W.D. Va. 2001)); cf
supra text accompanying note 119 (discussing judge Sotomayor's rejection of any dis-
tinction between interim and permanent custody orders when the order contains a ne
exeat clause).
135 See Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 227 (1895) ("J]udgments rendered... [in
a] foreign country ... are not entitled to full credit and conclusive effect when sued
upon in this country, but are prima facie evidence only of the justice of the plaintiff's
claim."); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 98 cmt. b (1971) ('Judg-
ments rendered in a foreign nation are not entitled to the protection of full faith and
credit.").
36 16 AM.JUR. 2D Conflict of Laws §§ 15,17 (1998).
.47 United States courts generally abide by the principle of comity when dealing
with Convention cases:
American courts will normally accord considerable deference to foreign ad-
judications as a matter of comity....
... [W]e see nothing in ICARA or its legislative history to indicate that
Congress wanted to bar the courts of this country from giving foreign judg-
ments the more flexible deference normally comprehended by the concept
of international comity.
Diorinou v. Mezitis, 237 F.3d 133, 142-43 (2d Cir. 2001); see also id. at 138-40, 142-45
(discussing principles of international comity and their application in Convention
cases); Blondin v. Dubois, 189 F.3d 240, 248-49 (2d Cir. 1999) ("In the exercise of
comity that is at the heart of the Convention ... , we are required to place our trust in
the court of the home country to issue whatever orders may be necessary to safeguard
children who come before it.").
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Courts are wary of deferring to foreign judgments if they do not
comport with domestic public policies."' Principles of due process
and the accompanying requirement that litigants be afforded a full,
fair hearing may constitute such overriding policies."" If courts were
to find that left-behind parents have no cognizable custody rights
once an interim order has been issued in favor of the abducting par-
ent, such public policies, if not constitutional mandates, are at risk of
losing their force. Deference to the terms of an interim judgment is-
sued before full consideration of the merits of the dispute does not
comport with the usual contours of comity followed by U.S. courts.
Deferring to decisions of foreign courts helps to protect U.S. chil-
dren, who may also be victims of international parental abduction, by
creating an atmosphere of international reciprocity. If the United
States acknowledges and respects the ability of other nations to pro-
tect children, the courts of those nations will respond in kind. Chil-
dren will then be more likely to be promptly returned to their coun-
tries of habitual residence, including the United States, so that the
forum with the closest relationship and greatest interest in the child
will be enabled to decide what custody arrangements will be in the
child's best interest. 14
138 See Falco Adkins v. Falco Antapara, 850 S.W.2d 148, 154 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1992)
(Franks,J, dissenting) (doubting the safety of the children if returned to Panama and
refusing to give effect to Panamanian order requiring return, stating that "our courts
are at liberty to give or refuse effect to such judgments as may be found just and equi-
table"); see also 16 AM. JUR. 2D Conflict of Laws § 15 (1998) ("Thus, comity will not be
accorded a foreign judgment, rendered by a competent court, if it violates a strong
public policy of the state.").
139 For example, the Colorado Court of Appeals has qualified the common law
comity doctrine with a fair hearing requirement:
Colorado courts recognize a decree from a foreign country as valid and en-
forceable under the common law principle of comity.... However, conclu-
sive effect may be given to a foreign judgment only if there has been an o
portunity for a full and fair trial before a court of competent jurisdiction and
only if the underlying claim for relief is not repugnant to the public policy of
the state.
In re Marriage of Seewald, 22 P.3d 580, 583 (Colo. Ct. App. 2001) (citations omitted).
140 In Turner v. Frowein, the Connecticut Supreme Court observed:
The treaty, properly enforced, should ensure that, when children from the
United States are abducted to any one of the treaty countries, the courts of
that country will not make their own determinations regarding custody with-
out first considering the ability and willingness of the United States to protect
its own children.
752 A.2d 955, 972-73 (Conn. 2000). From an international perspective,
where countries with disparate levels of economic and political development,
and contrasting systems of law, sign the same Convention, some diversity of
approach results, and the instinctive pull towards comity may be reduced. It
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When a court refuses to read an order granting interim custody to
a removing parent as terminating the other parent's custody rights, it
may in fact be giving effect to that order rather than nullifying it. By
declining to give full effect to the terms of the interim order, the court
respects the temporary nature of the order as designed by the foreign
court, as well as the jurisdiction of the foreign tribunal and its capacity
to identify and protect the best interests of the children habitually
resident there.
The United States's ratification of the Convention may have al-
tered U.S. courts' obligation to give effect to foreign custody orders
because the Convention represents a "special compact" regarding
recognition of foreign custody rights. 14 It does not follow, however,
that interim custody orders should conclusively establish the custody
rights at issue in a return petition, because the Convention does not
restrictively define "rights of custody." The Convention binds signa-
tory nations to give effect to the custody rights granted by other signa-
tories, but it does not bind them to any specific meaning of "custody
rights." Instead of finding the left-behind parent's custody rights
completely abrogated by a removal under the auspices of an interim
order in the abductor's favor, U.S. courts should consider the peti-
tioner's rights of custody in light of the Convention's purposes, the
practical realities of the situation, and the courts' broad interpretation
of the Convention's meaning of custody rights.
The Convention's return remedy is partially grounded on the
premise that the authorities of the country of habitual residence are
in the best position to consider the merits of the custody case and de-
cide the future of the child. 42 It makes little sense that a domestic
court should see an interim custody order-issued when the foreign
court has not yet resolved the dispute on the merits-as altering the
preexisting custody rights of the parties. When a court adopts that
approach, it may reject the petition for return based on the paradoxi-
is, however, a fundamental tenet of the Convention that each contracting
State must trust the others to deal fairly with cases of returning children, as
well as with applications for returns.
HUTCHINSON ET AL., supra note 18, at 9.
141 See Falco Adkins, 850 S.W.2d at 154 (Franks, J., dissenting) ("Absent a special com-
pact, no sovereign is bound to give effect within its dominions to a judgment rendered
by the tribunals of another country." (emphasis added)).
142 See BEAUMONT & McELEAVY, supra note 24, at 90 (explaining that the Conven-
tion's drafters believed that the habitual residence "should designate the forum con-
veniens for a subsequent merits hearing as to the custody of an abducted child" be-
cause the authorities there "should be best placed to determine the child's future").
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cal conclusion that removal was not wrongful. This result would
thwart the exact process the Convention seeks to accomplish by re-
turning the child to the country of his or her habitual residence, on
the basis that such a process had already begun.143 It would also en-
able a parent, by his or her unilateral action, to give permanent effect
to an order that the court intended as only a temporary measure.
Thus, the Convention would effectively serve to validate and finalize a
remedy that the foreign court intended as temporary, and allow a
court in another nation to substitute its own judgment for that of a
foreign court that had already demonstrated its willingness and ability
to deal with the custody matter.
IV. THE NONREMOVAL CLAUSE AND MILITARY NECESSITY EXCEPTION:
SHOULD THE SHEALYS' INTERIM DECISION HAVE BEEN
TREATED DIFFERENTLY?
Having proposed an approach to foreign interim custody orders
in Convention petitions, I turn now to some variations on a "simple"
interim custody order. As was true for the Shealys, courts sometimes
anticipate potential issues or disputes that may arise in the time be-
tween entry of an initial interim custody order and final resolution of
the case and may include special provisions in the interim order in an
attempt to avert them.
The interim custody order entered by the German court in the
Shealys' case was issued in connection with Sergeant Shealy's initial
request for sole custody. 144 The parties later agreed to temporaryjoint
custody-the German order formalized this agreement, pending the
scheduled evaluative meetings with the social worker.145 The German
interim decision, issued March 26, 2001, awarded Sergeant Shealy
"domicile-determination-rights" over Sierra, while prohibiting her
143 Professors Beaumont and McEleavy have stated:
An issue of particular interest is whether Article (3) (2) was intended to incor-
porate custody rights originating from "interim decisions"? Were temporary
orders of this type to be included, a parent could be deprived of the Conven-
tion remedy without the merits of the custody issue having been fully investi-
gated. Therefore, unless an express declaration is made to the contrary, it is
submitted that a provisional award of sole custody should not be recognised as
allowing a parent to remove a child to, or retain a child in, a foreign jurisdic-
tion.
Id. at 51-52.
144 Shealy v. Shealy, 295 F.3d 1117, 1120 (10th Cir. 2002).
145 Transcript, supra note 64, at 174, 176; Translation of Local Court Decision, su-
pra note 67.
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from removing Sierra from Germany without Mr. Shealy's consent un-
less required to do so by military reasons.' 46 In addition, it established
a detailed arrangement under which Sierra would stay with Mr. Shealy
each afternoon after kindergarten and from Thursday afternoon until
Sunday evening. 47 Finally, the order denied Sergeant Shealy's request
for "parental care.', 4 s The court scheduled evaluations of the Shealys
to aid the court in its decision regarding the more suitable parent.
Sergeant Shealy never met with the social worker because she left
Germany with Sierra one day before her first scheduled appoint-
ment."9
When considering whether Sierra was wrongfully removed from
Germany, the court found that Sierra was a habitual resident of Ger-
many, notwithstanding Sergeant Shealy's argument that Sierra was a
habitual resident of the United States by virtue of her residence on a
U.S. military base.""° The court then considered the effect of the in-
terim custody decision on the issue of whether the removal was wrong-
ful. The parties did not dispute that Mr. Shealy retained rights of cus-
tody, and the court decided that Mr. Shealy indeed had custody rights
after entry of the German order. '' Instead, the court focused on the
military necessity provision that was included in the German order.
Because the court found that Sergeant Shealy complied with the terms
of the military necessity provision by receiving transfer orders, despite
152its reservations regarding the circumstances surrounding their issue,
it determined that the removal was not wrongful under the Conven-
146 Translation of Local Court Decision, supra note 67.
147 Id.
148 Id.
14' Shealy, 295 F.3d at 1120.
50 Transcript, supra note 64, at 179-81. This finding was appropriate under the
Sixth Circuit's holding in Friedrich v. Friedrich: "As a threshold matter, a United States
military base is not sovereign territory of the United States. The military base [in ques-
tion] is on land which belongs to Germany and which the United States Armed Serv-
ices occupy only at the pleasure of the German government." 983 F.2d 1396, 1401
(6th Cir. 1993).
See Shealy, 295 F.3d at 1121 (discussing the district court's findings regarding
Mr. Shealy's custody rights).
152 The court's concern related to the fact that Sergeant Shealy actively requested
the transfer orders in order to avoid meeting with the social worker and a final resolu-
tion of the custody issue by the German court, and to the fact that, although she was
not required to report to her new duty station in the United States for another four




tion.153 Judge Daniel refused to "look behind" Sergeant Shealy's trans-
fer orders by questioning the timing of, and reasons for, their issue. 151
He decided that the military necessity exception had been satisfied
and that removal was therefore not wrongful. 1
5
5
If the questionable circumstances surrounding the issue of Ser-
geant Shealy's transfer orders and the timing of her removal of Sierra
from Germany are irrelevant to the Convention issue-a fact that is
far from clear-then Judge Daniel's conclusion regarding wrongful
removal would be correct if the interim order could alter rights under
the Convention. The court, however, should have more carefully con-
sidered the implications of the interim nature of the custody decision
on the Convention petition. By failing to analyze the interim nature
of the custody rights granted to the parties, the impact of the interim
nature of the decision with respect to those rights, and whether the
military necessity provision altered those rights at all, the court failed
to properly carry out its role in a Convention case and failed to ac-
complish the purposes of the Convention itself.
5 6
It is true that the district court judge did not need to look behind
the military necessity exception because, for purposes of the Conven-
tion, the exception was irrelevant. It was irrelevant because it was con-
tained in an order that, for the reasons discussed in Part III, had no
bearing on the custody rights of the parties with respect to the Con-
vention petition. Rather than refusing to look at the reasons behind
the orders and holding that removal was not wrongful, the court
should have looked at the factual realities of the parties' lives in Ger-
many-a perspective correctly adopted when the court ascertained
that Sierra's habitual residence was in Germany-and held that the
interim order did not alter the parties' custody rights under the Con-
vention. It appears that Mr. Shealy and Sergeant Shealy had nearly
equal caring functions in Sierra's life-in terms of both time and qual-
153 See Shealy, 295 F.3d at 1121 (noting the district court's finding that Sergeant
Shealy's actions complied with the military necessity exception).
55 Transcript, supra note 64, at 181.
155 Id. The Tenth Circuit affirmed this ruling. See Shealy, 295 F.3d at 1123-24 (de-
clining to find the trial court's decision with respect to the military necessity exception
erroneous).
156 The result is made even worse by the fact that it was based solely on the military
necessity exception included in the interim decision. Not only was the German deci-
sion temporary in nature-imbuing a Convention decision based on it with all the
problems discussed in Part I1, including the fact that the child's best interests had not
yet been determined by the German court-but allowing the military necessity clause
to define the parties' rights converted a provision that was not based on any considera-
tion of Sierra's best interests into a tenet of German custody law.
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ity-both before the German order and under its provisions. The in-
ternational removal certainly disrupted Sierra's familiar family rela-
tionships. 157 The Convention's spirit and purposes would have been
achieved by a finding that the interim order did not abrogate Mr.
Shealy's custody rights under the Convention. In addition, the Ger-
man court had undertaken to decide the custody dispute and pro-
ceedings were ongoing. The district court should have deferred to
that court's acceptance of jurisdiction or, alternatively, found that re-
moval before proceedings were finalized breached that court's own
rights of custody. Under any of these approaches, removal was wrong-
ful, and Sierra should have been returned to Germany for completion
of the custody proceedings there.
The military necessity exception was an exception to the ne exeat
clause contained in the interim order. Ne exeat clauses contained in
custody orders in the abducting parent's favor have been held, al-
though not universally, to confer cognizable custody rights either on
the left-behind parent or on the issuing foreign court.'" Courts have
been more willing to treat ne exeat clauses contained in interim cus-
tody orders as conferring custody rights on the interim noncustodial
parent or the court than they have to treat ne exeat clauses contained
157 See P&ez-Vera, Report, supra note 3, 57, at 442 (explaining that the behavior
the Convention seeks to prevent is "that which changes the ftamily relationships which
existed before or after any judicial decision, by using a child and thus turning [him or
her] into an instrument and principal victim of the situation").
58 Compare Thorne v. Dryden-Hall, [1997] 148 D.L.R.4th 508 (Can.) (holding that
removal of two children from the United Kingdom to Canada despite a nonremoval
clause was wrongfufl because it breached the English court's right to determine the
children's place of residence), and In re Marriage of Resina, Appeal No. 52, at 5-9
(Austl. Fam. Ct. 1991) (concluding that removal of children from Australia to France
was wrongful because it breached a nonremoval clause), with Croll v. Croll, 229 F.3d
133, 140 (2d Cir. 2000) (refusing to return the child after removal in breach of a ne
exeat clause because "a ne exeat clause.., confers only a veto, a power in reserve,
which gives the non-custodial parent no say (except by leverage) about any child-
rearing issue other than the child's geographical location"), and Thomson v. Thom-
son, [1994] 3 S.C.R. 551, 583-89 (Can.) (outlining three approaches to the issue of
whether nonremoval clauses constitute rights of custody under the Convention, and,
emphasizing the interim nature of the custody order, finding that removal in breach of
the clause was wrongful). See generally Martha Bailey, Canadas Implementation of the 1980
Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction, 33 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L.
& POL. 17, 30-34 (2000) (discussing the impact of a nonremoval clause on the custody
rights of the parties to a Convention petition); Christopher B. Whitman, Recent De-
velopment, Croll v. Croll: The Second Circuit Limits "Custody Rights" Under the Hag-te
Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction, 9 TUL. J. INT'L & COMP. L.
605 (2001) (reviewing the Croll court's decision with respect to the impact of a ne ex-
eat clause on custody rights).
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in permanent custody orders in that way.15 ' Had the Shealys' ne exeat
clause been part of a final custody order, Sergeant Shealy would have
had a stronger argument that Sierra's removal following her mother's
receipt of transfer orders did not breach the custody rights as estab-
lished in the order, because the nonremoval clause only operated as
long as no military necessity arose, and because the foreign court
would have completed its custody determination on the merits."
159 See Freeman, supra note 5, at 43'n.17 (discussing the distinction drawn by the
Canadian Supreme Court between ne exeat clauses in interim and permanent custody
orders); Linda Silberman, The Hague Child Abduction Convention Turns Twenty: Gender
Politics and Other Issues, 33 N.Y.U.J. INT'L L. & POL. 221, 230-31 (2000) (contrasting the
holding in Thomson requiring return of a child based on a nonremoval clause con-
tained in an interim custody order with the court's dicta "suggesting that restrictions
on removal in final custody orders were designed to protect access" but not custody
rights).
160 The district court should have more carefully evaluated her timing and the rea-
sons behind the issue of the orders. Sergeant Shealy's behavior in actively seeking a
transfer in order to remove Sierra from Germany under the guise of the military ne-
cessity exception, and in removing her to the United States more than four months
before she was required to report to her new duty station in the United States, should
have influenced the court's consideration of the military necessity exception. In Re W,
by comparison, the court was "emboldened to conclude" that the children were wrong-
fully removed because of the mother's questionable behavior:
[T]he behaviour of the mother... was calculated to frustrate the process of the court
[in the cotmtry of habitual residence]. Having resisted the father's contact
with the children for some time, she privately agreed to a much more liberal
regime than she had been prepared to concede at court.... The idea of
moving to Australia was tinder active investigation from much of the time be-
tween February and September 1997 but no hint of this was given to the fa-
ther, the court welfare officer or the court....
... There is something particularly repugnant about a litigant seeking to frustrate
the processes of the law in this way. This emboldens me to conclude that the re-
moval of the... children was wrongful within the meaning of the convention
because it.was in breach of rights of custody attributable to the court.
[1998] 2 F.L.R. 146, 160-61 (Fam.) (emphasis added). Sergeant Shealy's behavior
seems tohave been similarly reprehensible and calculated to "frustrate the processes"
of the German custody proceeding. The Convention seeks to prevent this sort of uni-
lateral maneuvering in custody disputes, and such circumstances should be considered
when deciding a Convention petition.
Other courts have also found the "contemptuous conduct" of the abductor to con-
stitute a factor to consider when determining whether removal breached the other
parent's custody rights. Seejanakakis-Kostun v. Janakakis, 6 S.W.3d 843, 849 (Ky. Ct.
App. 1999) (describing the distinction between visitation rights and custody rights as
"meritless" if "the removing parent ... engaged in 'contemptuous conduct' in remov-
ing the child from [his or her] habitual residence"); David S. v. Zamira S., 574 N.Y.S.2d
429, 432 (N.Y. Fain. Ct. 1991) ("Respondent's contention that the petitioner is not en-
titled under the Hague Convention to have their son returned, because he only had
visitation ('access') rights and not custody, might have some merit but for the respon-
dent's contemptuous conduct .... ).
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Based on the conditional nature of the nonremoval clause, the court
could have distinguished the cases holding that ne exeat clauses in
permanent custody orders confer custody rights on the other parent
or on the issuing court. However, the temporary nature of the cus-
tody order should prevail over the military necessity exception. The
exception is unrelated to the harms the Convention seeks to avoid
and has little to do with the welfare of the child. In contrast, the in-
terim order reflects the German court's intent to decide the merits of
the Shealys' custody dispute-the type of decision, by a tribunal in the
country of habitual residence, which the Convention seeks to protect
and promote.
Custody rights protected by the Convention may arise ex lege, by
judicial or administrative decision, or by virtue of a legally effective
agreement between the parties.'6' If a 'judicial or administrative deci-
sion" relating to the custody rights of parties to a Convention petition
is ineffective because it was entered on an interim basis, the court
should determine custody based on the other sources of custody
rights available to the parties. Stated another way, the court should
give little weight to any abrogation of rights that may be read into an
interim order, and should instead focus on the rights of the parties
prior to that order. In the Shealys' case, since no custody agreement
unrelated to the interim order was in place, the court should have re-
viewed the parties' ex lege custody rights. As married parents, the
Shealys had equal rights of custody under German law. 1
2
161 See Convention, suln'a note 2, at art. 3 ("The rights of custody... may arise in
particular by operation of law or by reason of a judicial or administrative decision, or
by reason of an agreement having legal effect tinder the law of that State.");
BEAUMONT & MCELEAVY, supra note 24, at 48-61 (discussing the primary, though not
exclusive, sources of custody rights under the Convention).
1132 The evidence in Shealy included a confirmation from a German attorney that
provided the court with a brief statement of the application of basic German custody
law to the Shealys' case:
[D]ue to the German legislation both parents are entitled to joint custody of
the shared child. This applies also after a separation, and even after a di-
vorce, if there is no other jUdicial court order. In the questioned case con-
cerning the married couple Shealy, a custody proceeding was pending, a de-
cision had not been made yet, which means that the married couple Shealy
are entitled to joint parental care, that means to joint custody, in respect to
the shared daughter Sierra Hope Shealy.
Only the domicile-determination-right for the parties' child had been
awarded to Mrs. Shealy. The domicile-deterrination-right is not identical
with the parental custody. Therefore Mrs. Shealy had at no time the sole cus-
tody of the parties' daughter.
Confirmation from Anne Sprunck-Preiss, Attorney, Becker & Sprunck-Preiss (Apr. 26,
2001) (on file with atthor).
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The district court's treatment of the military necessity exception
was somewhat disjointed. At oral argument, Judge Daniel asked Ser-
geant Shealy's counsel to "address [Re F] and the Pdrez-Vera re-
port ... both of which essentially state that the temporary order allow-
ing Miss Shealy to leave the country is not determinative of whether
her husband, Gregory Shealy's, custody rights were violated.""63 Ser-
geant Shealy's attorney distinguished those precedents on the basis
that Mr. Shealy and Sierra were in Germany only because of command
sponsorship as Sergeant Shealy's dependents; that sponsorship was
the only reason Mr. Shealy had or exercised any custody rights in
Germany.1 4 When announcing its decision, however, the court ac-
cepted Germany as Sierra's habitual residence and did not find that
Mr. Shealy lacked custody rights in Germany or under German law. 1;5
Instead, it found that Sergeant Shealy did not violate Mr. Shealy's cus-
tody rights because she had transfer orders that, the court believed,
satisfied the military necessity exception.'66 The court acknowledged
the precedent reducing the impact of interim custody orders, but ele-
vated the status of the military necessity clause above that of the tem-
porary nature of the order containing it.
The court construed the military necessity exception to mean Ser-
geant Shealy could not breach Mr. Shealy's custody rights if their
daughter's removal followed a military transfer order. Even if her ac-
tions complied with that provision and that compliance allowed her to
Because of the dual nature of the inquiry into custody rights, see supra notes 74-79
and accompanying text, the district court should have looked to the German order to
determine what rights were granted to the parties, and to the broad scope of rights
protected by the Convention to determine whether those constituted custody rights.
The German court awarded Sergeant Shealy interim "domicile-determination-rights."
Confirmation from Anne Sprunck-Preiss, supra. "Rights of custody," however, include
more than the right to determine where the child will live. See Convention, supra note
2, at art. 5 (explaining that the term "shall include rights relating to the care of the person of
the child and, in particular, the right to determine the child's place of residence" (em-
phasis added)). Even if the interim order were given effect, it did not strip Mr. Shealy
of all of his custody rights. Cf Thorne, [1997] 148 D.L.R.4th at 513 (holding that a cus-
tody order "leaves to both parents the remaining parental rights and responsibilities" if
it "states simply that 'the child shall live with [the mother,' and therefore] does not
grant [her] all of the rights encompassed by the word custody").
163 Transcript, supra note 64, at 158.
164 Id. at 158-59, 164.
165 See id. at 174 ("[The Shealys] agreed that instead of [Sergeant Shealy] seeking
sole custody, the parties would agree to joint custody."); see also Shealy v. Shealy, 295
F.3d 1117, 1122-23 (10th Cir. 2002) (agreeing with the district court's disposition of
the military necessity issue).
16 Transcript, supra note 64, at 181-82.
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remove the child, her actions, under Re , nevertheless breached Mr.
Shealy's custody rights by interfering with his ability to exercise those
rights in Germany."7 Sergeant Shealy's custody rights, either prior to
or following entry of the interim order, may have allowed her to re-
move Sierra from Germany, but that removal still violated Mr. Shealy's
right to exercise his custody rights in Germany. Removal under these
circumstances therefore constituted wrongful removal whether or not
the interim order, and its military necessity exception, is given effect.
The interim custody order should not have been found to alter
the parties' custody rights because it did not reflect a decision on the
merits made by the German court. With no judicial or administrative
decision in the state of habitual residence altering the parties' rights,
the district court should have restored the status quo by returning Si-
erra to Germany for completion of the pending proceedings, accom-
plishing the Convention's goal. Even if the interim order effectively
altered Sergeant Shealy's rights by granting her the right to remove
Sierra from Germany in the event of military necessity, Mr. Shealy's
rights of custody within the meaning of the Convention were never-
theless violated by the removal. The military necessity exception may
have altered one right in Sergeant Shealy's "bundle" of custody
rights, but it did not abrogate Mr. Shealy's custody rights. ' '
167 See sulra notes 86-95 and accompanying text (discussing Re P). Analyzing Re H,
Professors Beaumont and McEleavy stated:
If an individual is a child's sole custodian there are, prima facie, no restric-
tions on him relocating with that child. If there are such restrictions, that im-
plies that the custody right must in some way be limited. Where this is so it
must be that another body or individual holds a corresponding right in rela-
tion to the child. Therefore, should the primary carer remove the child
abroad.... he would have breached the custody rights of the other party, if
their consent had not been sought.
BEAUMONT & MCELEAVY, supra note 24, at 72-73.
168 See Croll v. Croll, 229 F.3d 133, 139 (2d Cir. 2000) ("The plural 'rights' [in Ar-
ticle 5 of the Convention] references a bundle of rights exercised by one or more per-
sons having custody .... ); see also Whallon v. Lynn, 230 F.3d 450, 457 (1st Cir. 2000)
(relying on Croll to adopt a "bundle" theory of custody rights, the various components
of which are "divisible" and may be held 'jointly or alone").
169 The P6rez-Vera report explained that the Convention was intended to
protect all the ways in which custody of children can be exercised. Actually,
in terms of article 3, custody rights may have been awarded to the person who
demands that their exercise be respected, and to that person in his own right
orjointly.... Now, from the Convention's standpoint, the removal of a child
by one of the joint holders without the consent of the other, is equally wrong-
ful, and this wrongfulness derives in this particular case, not from some action
in breach of a particular law, but from the fact that such action has disre-
garded the rights of the other parent which are also protected by law, and has
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The Convention seeks to protect the "practical realities" of a fam-
ily's custody arrangements. 0 The Shealys' preremoval practical real-
ity-particularly from the perspective of a four-year-old child unlikely
to understand the intricacies of "command sponsorship" and "military
necessity"-reflected residence of mother, father, and child in Ger-
many, with care and control of Sierra shared by Mr. and Sergeant
Shealy. The Convention's "underlying principle" is "to secure a swift
return of the abducted child to the state in which the child was ha-
bitually resident without undertaking a full investigation of the merits
of the abductor's case, unless specific criteria set out in the Conven-
tion prevail."'17' In Shealy, Sierra's habitual residence was Germany, the
left-behind parent had custody rights that could no longer be exer-
cised following removal, a court in the foreign state had exercised ju-
risdiction to decide the merits of a custody dispute between two par-
ents with equal rights of custody but had not yet completed the task,
and none of the exceptions to return provided by the Convention ap-
plied or were argued to apply. The district court should have de-
clined jurisdiction of the custody issues in light of the German court
proceeding; the U.S. court was not required to recognize the interim
order or the military necessity exception contained therein.
Sierra's return to Germany would have accomplished the policies
and purposes of the Convention. Consistently returning the child in
custody disputes similar to the Shealys' would deter parents from in-
ternationally abducting their children under the guise of rights
granted by interim custody orders-making them aware that such re-
moval is actionable under the Convention and will only temporarily
avoid the custody laws of the country of habitual residence. Similarly,
return would prevent forum-shopping by rendering Sergeant Shealy's
interfered with their normal exercise. The Convention's true nature is re-
vealed most clearly in these situations: it is not concerned with establishing
the person to whom custody of the child will belong at some point in the fu-
ture, nor with the situations in which it may prove necessary to modify a deci-
sion awarding joint custody on the basis of facts which have subsequently
changed. It seeks, more simply, to prevent a later decision on the matter be-
ing influenced by a change of circumstances brought about through unilat-
eral action by one of the parties.
Prez-Vera, Report, supra note 3, 1 71, at 447-48.
170 VAN BUEREN, supra note 14, at 16.
171 Id. at 17.
172 See Legal Analysis, supra note 11, at 10,507 ("Even when custody rights are con-
ferred by court decree, technically speaking the Convention does not mandate recog-
nition and enforcement of that decree. Instead, it seeks only to restore the factual cus-
tody arrangements that existed prior to the wrongful removal or retention .... ").
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unilateral attempt to alter the jurisdiction of her custody dispute inef-
fective. In addition, return would have prevented Sergeant Shealy
from "legitimizing the situation for which [she was] responsible, 17 by
effectively transforming an interim order into a de facto final order
elevating Sergeant Shealy's purported right to exercise her custody
rights in the United States over Mr. Shealy's right to exercise his in
Germany. Finally, return would effectuate the Convention's purpose
of allowing the merits of the custody dispute to be heard in a tribunal
in the country closest to the Shealys' family situation during Sierra's
lifetime and nearest the information necessary to adjudicate the mer-
its of the dispute.
CONCLUSION
International child abduction creates difficult cases, in both emo-
tional and legal terms. Despite these challenges, courts in the United
States have been entrusted by Congress to fairly and expeditiously de-
cide petitions brought pursuant to the Hague Convention on the Civil
Aspects of International Child Abduction in keeping with the Conven-
tion's broad design. Understanding the broad scope of the custody
rights protected by the Convention is often the first challenge facing a
court asked to decide a Convention petition.
I have suggested an analytical approach to Convention petitions
tinder which a court would not take a foreign interim custody order at
face value, but rather would consider it in light of all the factual and
legal circumstances of the child and the parties prior to the removal,
as well as the willingness and ability of the foreign court to resolve the
matter. This approach is consistent with that adopted by a number of
foreign jurisdictions. It also more accurately reflects the purposes of
the Convention and the complex realities presented by an interna-
tional abduction case than the approach taken by the Shealy court.
Had the District of Colorado followed this approach, Sierra would
have been promptly returned to Germany, enabling the German court
to complete its task of deciding to which parent it would be best to en-
trust her care.
Although there were no allegations of abuse in Shealy, a very broad
invocation of the return remedy has raised some concerns that the
remedy and the exceptions to return do not offer sufficient protection
for battered spouses who move their children across international
173 D.S. v. V.W., [1996] 134 D.L.R.4th 481, 500 (Can.).
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boundaries in an attempt to flee domestic violence.1 14 My approach
does not ignore the grave realities of domestic violence or the com-
plex and sad circumstances that may lead to some international ab-
ductions. It simply allows the judicial system of the country of habit-
ual residence to protect children and spouses of violent offenders.
175
If the child faces a grave risk of harm upon return to the habitual
residence, the Article 13(b) exception may be invoked to prevent re-
turn. 17  The issue of protection from harm should be considered
when determining whether any exceptions to return apply, not when
determining whether removal violated custody rights and whether
removal was wrongful. Perhaps the Convention's broad view of cus-
tody rights should be balanced by granting courts discretion to look
more carefully at the risks children and abducting parents faced that
led the parents to take such drastic action. However, those policy
considerations should be dealt with, if at all, through either revision of. ~177
the Convention, if the signatories desire expressly to offer more pro-
tection for abused parents, or through application of the exceptions.
174 See, e.g., Silberman, supra note 159, at 224-25, 241 (calling for "creative re-
sponses directed to concerns about... protecting children and a spouse from domes-
tic violence," but wary that "exception[s] will begin to swallow the rule [favoring re-
turn]" (citation omitted)); Weiner, supra note 79, at 601 (discussing the shortcomings
of the Convention with respect to victims of domestic violence and suggesting a "total
defense" to the remedy of return for battered women). The Convention may have
failed to adequately address potential issues of domestic violence because the drafters
envisaged the abductors primarily as noncustodial fathers who were dissatisfied with
the outcomes of custody disputes. See Silberman, supra note 159, at 223-24 (observing
that "many 'abductors' have turned out to be custodial mothers-mothers who have
lived abroad during the marriage, who have obtained custody when the marriage fails,
and who desire to return to their home country after the breakdown of the marriage").
175 See Blondin v. Dubois, 189 F.3d 240, 249 (2d Cir. 1999) (requiring "considera-
tion of the range of remedies that might allow both the return of the children to their
home country and their protection from harm"); Friedrich v. Friedrich, 78 F.3d 1060,
1068 (6th Cir. 1996) ("[C]ourts in the abducted-from country are as ready and able as
we are to protect children.... [W]e can expect that country's courts to [protect chil-
dren from danger].... When we trust the court system in the abducted-from country,
the vast majority of claims of harm ... evaporate." (citations omitted)).
176 See Convention, supra note 2, at art. 13(b) (acknowledging an exception to the
remedy of return upon proof of "a grave risk that his or her return would expose the
child to physical or psychological harm or otherwise place the child in an intolerable
situation"); supra note 54 and accompanying text (describing the "grave risk" excep-
tion).
177 See Weiner, supra note 79, at 599-600 (evaluating Convention revisions that
would protect victims of domestic violence, such as orders of protection, a domestic
violence defense to return, and allowing the removing parent to litigate custody in the
country of habitual residence from a safe location abroad).
2002]
666 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW
Domestic violence does not bear on the prima facie issue of
whether a left-behind parent had rights of custody under the law prior
to the removal. Rather, violence bears on which parent should have
custody when the dispute has reached some level of finality-that is,
when a court having jurisdiction, as well as all necessary evidence, to
resolve a custody dispute makes an ultimate custody determination. A
court presented with a petition for return is not such a court-the
Convention and ICARA only grant limited jurisdiction to decide the
case under the provisions of the Convention and explicitly withhold
jurisdiction to determine custody.
The approach to interim orders I suggest concerns how the Con-
vention should be properly interpreted with respect to its language
and stated purposes, not how it could better have been drafted to pro-
tect women and children from violent fathers. A broad approach to
interpretation of custody rights does not abdicate the responsibility to
protect children's best interests; it simply recognizes that the country
of habitual residence is better situated to do so. A broad reading of
custody rights will also serve to protect American children abducted
abroad by promoting international comity; American parents will be
able more easily to secure return of their own children removed to
other countries if the United States is seen as an international partner
in returning children whose custody is properly decided in their coun-
try of habitual residence. Finally, my approach would promote ami-
cable custody agreements-if interim custody were not held to abro-
gate the temporarily noncustodial parent's custody rights, he or she
would not have to fear loss of his or her custody rights by agreeing to
interim custody for the other parent. Thus, courts should look behind
interim custody orders to the real experiences of children and their
families and should acknowledge other nations' ability and willingness
to act in children's best interests. By doing so, courts will more effec-
tively contribute to the scheme created by the international commu-
nity to address the global child abduction problem.
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